44762

National Library of Canada
Bibliothèque nationale du Canada

Canadian Theses Division
Division des thèses canadiennes

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4

PERMISSION TO MICROFILM — AUTORISATION DE MICROFILMER

• Please print or type — Écrire en lettres moulées ou dactylographier

Full Name of Author — Nom complet de l'auteur

Ronald E. KREBS

Date of Birth — Date de naissance

OCT. 21/46

Country of Birth — Lieu de naissance

WEST GERMANY

Permanent Address — Résidence fixe

9006 - 184 street, Edmonton Alberta

T5T 1R2

Title of Thesis — Titre de la thèse

A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PHENOMENOLOGICAL FOUNDATION FOR INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY

University — Université

ALBERTA, Edmonton

Degree for which thesis was presented — Grade pour lequel cette thèse fut présentée

MASTER OF ARTS

Year this degree conferred — Année d'obtention de ce grade

1980

Name of Supervisor — Nom du directeur de thèse

DR. R. JUNG

Permission is hereby granted to the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF CANADA to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.

L'autorisation est, par la présente, accordée à la BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE DU CANADA de microfilmer cette thèse et de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.

L'auteur se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans l'autorisation écrite de l'auteur.

Date

April 17/80

Signature

R. Krebs

NL-91 (4/77)

National Library of Canada
Collections Development Branch

Canadian Theses on
Microfiche Service

Bibliothèque nationale du Canada
Direction du développement des collections

Service des thèses canadiennes
sur microfiche

NOTICE

The quality of this microfiche is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us a poor photocopy.

Previously copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this film is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30. Please read the authorization forms which accompany this thesis.

THIS DISSERTATION
HAS BEEN MICROFILMED
EXACTLY AS RECEIVED

AVIS

La qualité de cette microfiche dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de mauvaise qualité.

Les documents qui font déjà l'objet d'un droit d'auteur (articles de revue, examens publiés, etc.) ne sont pas microfilmés.

La reproduction, même partielle, de ce microfilm est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30. Veuillez prendre connaissance des formules d'autorisation qui accompagnent cette thèse.

LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ
MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE
NOUS L'AVONS REÇUE

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4

NL-339 (Rev. 8/80)

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PHENOMENOLOGICAL FOUNDATION FOR INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY

by

© RONALD E. KREBS

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

SPRING, 1980

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled A Framework for the Establishment of a Phenomenological Foundation for Interpretive Sociology submitted by Ronald E. Krebs in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Richard Jung
Supervisor

Date February, 1980

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to present a transcendental-phenomenological *framework* within which the question of the phenomenological *constitutional foundation* for the empirical science of interpretive sociology can be raised.

This framework is formally structured by means of three interrelated transformations. Each transformation is made up of an operator-operand-transform sequence. On to this transformational structure, transcendental-phenomenological concepts are mapped. The result is a framework made up of two distinct levels: a formal level and a conceptual level. The first transformation is directed towards the establishment of the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint. This transformation begins with an operator: the epochē, that operates upon an operand: the natural standpoint. This operation yields a negative transform: the bracketing of the general thesis of the natural standpoint as well as a positive transform: the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint.

The second tranformation is directed towards the establishment of the eidetic structure of the transdendental-phenomenological standpoint. This transformation begins with an operator: the eidetic reduction, that operates upon the operand: the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint. This operation yields a transform that states that the eidetic structure of the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint is primarily a constitutional structure within which constitutional processes operate.

The third transformation is directed towards the establishment of the eidetic structure of any specific constitutional process. This transformation begins with an operator: constitutional analysis, that operates upon the operand: any specific constitutional process. This operation yields the transform: the eidetic structure of any specific constitutional process.

Within this third transformation it becomes possible to raise the question of the phenomenological *constitutional foundation* for the empirical science of interpretive sociology.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Seven years ago I began my theoretical training under the direction of Doctor R. Jung. During this period Doctor Jung taught me to understand the dedication and rigor necessary to serious theoretical work. During the five years it took to complete this thesis his unbroken support and unwarranted confidence in my largely unproven capabilities helped me to deal with the awesome problem of having the freedom to explore and to theorize in an almost infinite field of research. Finally, Doctor Jung has, through his own example, taught me what it means to strive for excellence in one's working life. For this he has my profound gratitude.

A warm debt of gratitude is owed to Doctor P. Saram for his continued friendship and encouragement, particularly on those occasions when I felt I could go no further. Special appreciation must also be expressed to Doctor L. Moss for his support and assistance throughout the long process of pursuing a rather unconventional thesis topic.

Finally, words are inadequate to convey the gratitude I feel for the boundless faith my wife Judy has consistently expressed in support of my decision to follow a long, difficult and costly course of endeavour. Without her unbroken support and her willingness to type and retype numerous drafts, this thesis certainly would not have been completed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

	Page
INTRODUCTION	2
1. Purpose	2
2. Procedure	5
3. Organization	9
CHAPTER ONE: E. HUSSERL'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PHILOSOPHIES OF DESCARTES, KANT, AND HUME AND THEIR RELATION TO HIS PHENOMENOLOGY	18
1. E. Husserl's interpretation of the philosophy of R. Descartes and its relation to his phenomenology	18
2. E. Husserl's interpretation of the philosophy of I. Kant and its relation to his phenomenology	24
3. E. Husserl's interpretation of the philosophy of D. Hume and its relation to his phenomenology	34
CHAPTER TWO: INTRODUCTION TO THE IDEA OF A FOUNDATION	42
1. Husserl's problem: the crisis of science	42
2. Husserl's solution to the crisis	44

THE FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER THREE: TRANSFORMATION: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL STANDPOINT	56
1. Operand: the natural standpojnt	56
2. Operator: epochē	58
3. Transform:	
negative result: the general thesis of the natural standpoint is bracketed	59
positive result: the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint	63

Page

CHAPTER FOUR: TRANSFORMATION: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EIDETIC STRUCTURE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL STANDPOINT 71

1. Operand: the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint 71

2. Operator: eidetic reduction 72

3. Transform: the eidetic structure of the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint is primarily a constitutional structure within which constitutional processes operate 76

CHAPTER FIVE: TRANSFORMATION: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EIDETIC STRUCTURE OF ANY SPECIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS 97

1. Operand: any specific constitutional process 97

2. Operator: constitutional analysis 97

3. Transform: the eidetic structure of any specific constitutional process 102

FINAL REMARKS

ON THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE INTERPRETIVE UNDERSTANDING OF SOCIAL ACTION COULD YIELD A PHENOMENOLOGICAL FOUNDATION FOR INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 124

SUMMARY 139

BIBLIOGRAPHY 152

APPENDIX: THE MOTIVATION FOR WRITING THIS THESIS 155

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure		Page
1.	The formal structure of the framework	11
2.	The formal structure and its phenomenological conceptualization: the framework	12

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

INTRODUCTION

1. PURPOSE

It is the purpose of this thesis to present a *framework* that makes possible the eventual establishment of a phenomenological *foundation* for "interpretive sociology".[1] More specifically, it is my purpose to present a transcendental-phenomenological framework within which the question of the phenomenological *constitutional* foundation for the empirical science of interpretive sociology can be raised.

The above statement of purpose reveals two interrelated components. The first is the presentation of a *framework* and the second is the raising of the question of a *constitutional foundation* from within this framework. So the presentation of the framework permits or makes possible the raising of the question of a constitutional phenomenological foundation from within this framework. This framework itself includes the basic structure of the question to be raised. Consequently, the presentation of the framework is considered the central aim and achievement of this thesis.

As a framework *for* the *eventual* establishment of a phenomenological constitutional foundation for interpretive sociology, it does *not* claim to establish such a constitutional foundation itself. However, since this is a framework within which the problem of the constitutional foundation for interpretive sociology can be raised, the framework does itself exercise a foundational function for such a constitutional foundation. This is because the framework intro-

duces some of the most central transcendental-phenomenological presuppositions that such a constitutional foundation presumes. Furthermore, this framework, does *contribute* to the establishment of a constitutional phenomenological foundation for interpretive sociology by showing how the question of a foundation for interpretive sociology can be raised within it.

At this point it might be best to summarize the levels of concern implied above. Firstly, one can distinguish the level that is concerned with the presentation of a transcendental-phenomenological framework. It is *within* this framework that the general question of the constitutional phenomenological foundation for any science can be *addressed*. Secondly, one can distinguish the transcendental-phenomenological constitutional foundation for interpretive sociology that could be developed within the above framework. This level then refers to the *actual* constitutional foundation for interpretive sociology. Thirdly, one can distinguish the empirical science of interpretive sociology that gets its foundation through the development of the second level of concern.

This separation of the three interdependent levels of concern makes it possible to further clarify the purpose of this thesis. This thesis has as its *goal* the presentation of the *framework* within which the general question of the constitutional phenomenological foundation for any science can be addressed. This places my central goal squarely on the first level of concern. However, the telos that gives sense and purpose to the description of this framework lies in levels two and three. In other words, this framework is

described in order to facilitate the *eventual* establishment of a phenomenological foundation (level two) for empirical interpretive sociology (level three).

While the central concern of this thesis is with the presentation of a framework (level one), this framework permits me to raise the questions the answers to which would ultimately be provided in level two. Consequently, since the structure of the question of a phenomenological foundation for interpretive sociology is also to be introduced (due to its "location" in the framework), this thesis, to this extent, also moves into level two.

In the context of making the question of a constitutional phenomenological foundation for interpretive sociology intelligible, some illustrative excursions are also made into the "substance" of such a foundation. However, the validity of this thesis is not dependent upon the acceptability of these preliminary excursions into the actual conceptual substance of the phenomenological foundation for interpretive sociology. The preliminary excursions into the substantive conceptualization of such a foundation must be viewed only as "signposts" or heuristic devices that show the direction that such concrete substantive analysis can take. They are introduced primarily to help make intelligible the question of a constitutional phenomenological foundation for interpretive sociology.

In retrospect, one could say that the purpose of this thesis is to present a transcendental-phenomenological foundation - the framework - that makes the eventual establishment of a constitutional foundation for interpretive sociology a possibility. Consequently,

we have here a foundational framework for a foundation to be developed in a future work.

2. PROCEDURE

The presentation of the framework, which is to be the central part of this thesis, will be based exclusively on the writings of Edmund Husserl (1859 - 1938). Consequently, only original sources will be used when it is a question of defining the concepts central to this framework. However, outside of this area secondary sources will occasionally be referred to. This will be the case, for example, when a comment made by one of his students is useful for the illumination of the problem at hand. In addition, secondary sources will be used when it seems appropriate to refer to one of Husserl's unpublished manuscripts or to one of his untranslated works.

While every attempt will be made to define clearly and explicitly the concepts that make up this framework through direct reference to Husserl's works, this procedure is not as easy to adhere to as one might expect. According to R. Sokolowski,

> when he introduces a concept, Husserl rarely gives an explicit and precise definition. The meaning he attributes to it is often determined more by the use he makes of a term than by what he expressly says about it, and therefore the context into which it is introduced, the manner in which it is treated, and the problems it is supposed to solve, all must be considered if we are to recover the meaning of his terms (1970:41).

Husserl justifies this shortcoming by insisting that "exact definitions do not lie at the threshold of analysis of the kind we are here making, but are a later result involving great labour" (1969a:115). He argues

that it "is misleading and radically perverse to apply the formal and external standards of a logic of terminology to scientific work in the first stages of progressive effort, and in their first beginnings to exact from them terminologies of the kind first used to render stable the concluding results of great scientific developments" (ibid.:245). Nevertheless, at the risk of being "radically perverse", every effort will be made to define as explicitly as possible each single concept introduced.

Furthermore, within the framework itself concepts will not be used in the discussion until they have been explicitly introduced in the course of the presentation of the framework. Unavoidably, this standard must be relaxed in the introductory chapters preceeding the presentation of the framework.

Also, in the construction of this framework another procedure will involve the inclusion of only those elements of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology that seem to be necessary in order to show how the question of the phenomenological foundation for interpretive sociology can be raised. This, therefore, will serve as a principle for the selection and rejection of aspects of Husserl's phenomenology for this framework. Consequently, only those aspects have been chosen that seem to contribute to the construction of a simple phenomenological framework within which foundational questions can be raised.

Because of this principle of selection no attempt will be made to summarize the whole of Husserl's work. In fact, the size and complexity of Husserl's work makes an exhaustive summary almost

inconceivable. For example, the Husserl-Archives at Louvain, Belgium, contain not only the manuscripts of his published works but also "the unpublished manuscripts left untouched after Husserl's death and now being transcribed; they comprise approximately forty thousand pages of shorthand set down by Husserl.... By 1962 nine volumes [including both published and unpublished works], totalling some four thousand pages, had been published in the *Husserliana* series" (J.J. Kockelmans, 1967:20-21). Consequently, the sheer size of Husserl's scholarly work indeed makes any attempt at a summary down right foolhardy.

A further restriction is introduced by the unavoidable decision to restrict myself only to those works translated into English. Furthermore, of those works several will be de-emphasized because of their more specialized formal, logical slant. These include Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic,* his *Formal and Transcendental Logic,* and his *Experience and Judgment*. In addition, the first two listed works are also de-emphasized because of their pre-transcendental orientation. Nevertheless, occasional reference will be made to these less relevant works.

The principle of selection, that has been adopted here, requires that only those aspects of Husserl's phenomenology be selected that seem to be necessary in order to show how the question of the phenomenological foundation for interpretive sociology can be raised. However, this does not, in my opinion, subvert or distort the essential structure of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. This is because the problem of providing a foundation for the sciences is, I believe, the

central telos towards which Husserl's transcendental phenomenology tends. This contention is supported by R.A. Mall, for example, who refers to the concept of a "foundation [as] the guiding unitary thread of [Husserl's] whole thought" (1973:9). Consequently, both this framework and Husserl's transcendental phenomenology derive their sense from the same goal. Therefore, my interest in foundations, as a goal and as a principle for selection, seems to be shared by Husserl, and since, therefore, both this framework and Husserl's transcendental phenomenology gain their guiding sense from the same telos, the framework to be presented here does not distort the sense of transcendental phenomenology (presuming, of course, that the task here proposed is properly carried out). However, this, of course, does not preclude the possibility that other concepts essential to such a framework could subsequently be included.[2]

Another procedural decision involves placing any *extensive* criticism and redevelopment of Husserl's phenomenology beyond the scope of this thesis. Consequently, the presentation of the framework will be based on what could be called a sympathetic interpretation of Husserl's work. Furthermore, since this framework and its application has not previously been presented in this manner, a critical commentary seems somewhat premature.

Once the framework has been presented my procedure next will be to raise the question of a phenomenological foundation for interpretive sociology. This will be done by placing some of Weber's concepts "within" the more general framework presented, by re-interpreting them and then by posing the appropriate phenomenological foundational

questions in this context.

3. ORGANIZATION

"Horizontally", this thesis will be organized into three parts consisting of some "introductory remarks", "the framework" that is the central achievement of this thesis, and some "final remarks".

The "introductory remarks" will consist of: the present introduction, a chapter that relates Husserl's phenomenology to some of the central aspects of his philosophical heritage, and a chapter that is designated to introduce to the reader the "idea of a foundation". A brief introduction to the idea of a foundation seems necessary since this is the telos that both this framework and Husserl's transcendental-phenomenology tends towards. Consequently, since this telos lends sense to the framework to be presented in the next part, and, therefore lends sense to the thesis as a whole, some preliminary idea of the nature of a phenomenological foundation seems indispensable. Of course, as the thesis unfolds this preliminary idea of a foundation will be reinforced and developed.

Having presented the "introductory remarks", the reader will be better equipped to understand the "framework" that is to be presented in the second part and for which the remarks of the first part serve as an introduction.

Also, "horizontally", this *framework* (the "second part") will be organized formally by means of three interrelated "transformations".[3] Each of these three transformations presupposes the transformation that precedes it. Consequently, the resulting structure of related transformations gives complete formal unity to the framework to be

presented in this part. Figure one in conjunction with the subsequent discussion should give some idea of what is here meant by the idea of a transformation.

As figure one shows, a transformation consists of nothing more than an operator-operand-transform sequence. The operator is said to operate upon the operand. This two part sequence is called an operation. This operation then yields a transform. Figure one shows three transformations. These three transformations are identical except for the order of their appearance. This order is such that the third transformation presupposes the second and first and, of course, the second transformation presupposes the first.

In addition, for the reader's guidance, I have matched chapters with transformations, as shown.

Now, in figure two, the phenomenological concepts are mapped onto or matched with the strictly formal aspects outlined in figure one.[4] More precisely, figure two presents the two strata together in the form of the framework that is the central achievement of this thesis.

Briefly, chapter three describes how it is possible to shift from the "natural standpoint" to the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint. This shift is made possible through the operation of the epochē. Chapter four describes the essential or eidetic structure of this new standpoint. This description is made possible through the operation of the eidetic reduction. Chapter five shows the kind of work that can be carried out within this eidetic structure. This work is made possible through the operation of constitutional analysis. Of course, this constitutional analytic operation itself presupposes and is made

FIGURE ONE: THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE FRAMEWORK



FIGURE TWO: THE FORMAL STRUCTURE AND ITS PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONCEPTUALIZATION: THE FRAMEWORK


FIRST TRANSFORMATION:
The establishment of the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint:
FIRST OPERATOR: epochē
FIRST OPERAND:
the natural standpoint
FIRST TRANSFORM:
negative result: the general thesis of the natural standpoint is bracketed
positive result: the transcendental phenomenological standpoint
(PRESUPPOSES)
SECOND TRANSFORMATION:
The establishment of the eidetic structure of the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint:
SECOND OPERATOR: eidetic reduction
SECOND OPERAND:
the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint
SECOND TRANSFORM:
the eidetic structure of the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint is primarily a constitutional structure within which constitutional processes operate
(PRESUPPOSES)
THIRD TRANSFORMATION:
The establishment of the eidetic structure of any specific constitutional process:
THIRD OPERATOR: constitutional analysis
THIRD OPERAND:
any specific constitutional process
THIRD TRANSFORM:
the eidetic structure of any specific constitutional process

possible by the previous two transformations. Consequently, they are still in operation when the work of the final transformation is carried out.

Before the "vertical" organization of this framework is discussed a final cautionary note regarding this framework seems in order. Since "Husserl's general style of work ... is not a logical construction of thought but rather reports about descriptive investigations on the nature or essence of certain objects or facts" (R. Ingarden, 1975:8), one of my biggest problems involved the orderly presentation of the material. In other words, it seemed difficult to present each concept without presupposing other concepts that were scheduled to appear later. Consequently, the possibility of re-presenting this framework in an alternative order or format is left as an open and reasonable possibility.

As figure two has shown, this framework is also organized "vertically" into two distinguishable strata: the formal transformational structure and the phenomenological conceptualization of that structure. Together these two strata, that make up the framework, point beyond this framework to a third stratum that presupposes this framework. More specifically, since this bi-stratum framework is a framework within which specific constitutional foundational questions can be raised, this framework immediately points beyond itself to a third stratum. This third stratum is made up of the actual regional constitutional phenomenological foundations. It is at this third stratum that the problem of the foundation for interpretive sociology can in principle be solved. So a complete phenomenological foundation

for empirical interpretive sociology would ultimately have these three strata. In other words, the constitutional phenomenological foundation for interpretive sociology (stratum three), necessarily presupposes strata one and two. Consequently, the framework here presented is itself foundational for the foundation here proposed (although not described) for empirical interpretive sociology, the fourth stratum.

So, if we look at the overall "vertical" form that provides a structure for this thesis (not the "horizontal" three part, chapter by chapter, transformational organization) four strata present themselves. The first stratum is simply the purely formal idea of a transformation. The second is the phenomenological conceptualization of this formal idea of a transformation. This, of course, defines the framework. The third stratum consists of the actual constitutional phenomenological foundations for different regions of reality. This stratum is briefly exemplified on the basis of Husserl's analyses. Also, at this stratum the question of the phenomenological foundation for interpretive sociology is raised (although not answered). Finally, the fourth stratum is the empirical science of interpretive sociology that could be developed on the basis of the three strata foundation outlined above. The characterization of this stratum, is, of course, well beyond the scope of this thesis.

Each of these strata presupposes the ones preceding it. Consequently, each stratum provides a foundational function for those that follow it. So it can be seen how fundamental and important the idea of a transformation is for the organization of these endeavours. The

three transformation structure orders, limits and unifies the whole problem of a foundation for the empirical science of interpretive sociology.

As mentioned at the beginning of this discussion concerning the organization of this thesis, the presentation will be organized horizontally into three parts: the introductory remarks, the framework and some final remarks. The first two parts have already been introduced. The final remarks will include a section entitled: *On the Possibility of Further Constitutional Research: The Constitutional Analysis of the Interpretive Understanding of Social Action Could Yield a Phenomenological Foundation for Interpretive Sociology.*

The aim of this section is simply to raise the question of a phenomenological foundation for interpretive sociology and to show how it fits into and presupposes the framework presented in chapters three to five. The question of a phenomenological foundation will turn out to be a constitutional question. Consequently, the question of a phenomenological foundation for interpretive sociology can be addressed within the "third transformation" entitled *The Establishment of the Eidetic Structure of Any Specific Constitutional Process.* While this foundational question can be raised within the third transformation of the two strata framework, the result: the constitutional foundation itself, will occupy the third stratum.

Also, the final remarks part will include a section that summarizes the central argument of this thesis.

FOOTNOTES

1. Since Alfred Schutz declared his intention "to give to interpretive sociology [a] philosophical foundation" (1967:43), sociologists have expressed an interest in this problem from a phenomenological perspective. While Schutz's attempt is generally accepted as a contribution towards the establishment of a phenomenological foundation for interpretive sociology, it has become evident to me that his theoretical achievements presuppose a more fundamental framework. It is the purpose of this thesis to contribute to the establishment of such a foundation by describing this "more fundamental framework".

While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to organize and systematically criticize Schutz's theoretical achievements in the light of this framework, it is my hope that the specification of this framework will ultimately contribute to the systematization of any future attempts that necessarily must take Schutz's efforts into account. Although, a systematic criticism and reconstruction of Schutz's work is beyond the scope of this thesis, some brief criticisms of his work will be noted in order to provide the reader with some understanding of how the position taken in this thesis differs from the direction taken by Schutz.

2. One such concept referes to the phenomenon of temporality, and the role that it plays in the constitutional process. While temporality is sporadically mentioned in Husserl's transcendental constitutional writings, it is not sufficiently discussed to permit its systematic inclusion in this thesis. It is of course discussed by Husserl in a pre-transcendental work entitled *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*. Since this concept is primarily developed in a pre-transcendental context, the problem of thoroughly developing the concept of temporality in a transcendental context and integrating it with the transcendental constitutional process remains. As R. Sokolowski states "... the concepts in the lectures on time have to be combined with those of the *Ideas*" (1970:163). This ultimately results in viewing the problem of constitution in a more "genetic" or temporal fashion. This concept of "genetic constitution" is introduced briefly in section two of Husserl's *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and in his *Cartesian Meditations*. In his *Cartesian Meditations* he no longer feels that the subjective noetic-hyletic distinction can be upheld when temporality is introduced. Instead he uses the concept of a "cogito" to encompass both hyletic and noetic spheres. However, before the concept of temporality can be thoroughly integrated into the theory of constitution much theoretical work remains.

3. The idea of a "transformation" is taken from R. Jung's "*Systems of Orientation*".

4. The decision to present this framework in two distinct strata draws its inspiration from R. Jung's view of the nature of theory (1965). Simply put, Doctor Jung argues that any theory must have two levels: a formal level and a conceptual level. Doctor Jung's theory of theory is itself organized formally and conceptually. The formal level consists of set-theoretical formulations and the conceptual consists of phenomenological conceptions.

CHAPTER ONE: E. HUSSERL'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PHILOSOPHIES OF DESCARTES, KANT, AND HUME AND THEIR RELATION TO HIS PHENOMENOLOGY

As the title to this chapter indicates, my intention is to try to present aspects of Husserl's own interpretation of the philosophies of Descartes, Kant and Hume. Similarly, it is Husserl's interpretation of the relation of their philosophies to his own that is here introduced. Consequently, no attempt is made to present the philosophies of Descartes, Kant and Hume according to what might be called a "more objective" or orthodox interpretation.

This approach is justified by the purpose of this chapter which is to make Husserl's phenomenology more intelligible by relating it to the intellectual context from which it takes its lead. So we must look at this context the way that Husserl looks at it - at least so far as this is possible - in order to see how his own philosophy grows out of it. This perspective would be in danger of being obscured if more orthodox interpretations were to be used to help make intelligible Husserl's phenomenology. By looking at it from his perspective we can better understand his own philosophical reaction to it, the reaction that took the form of the attempt to develop a philosophy called "transcendental-phenomenology".

1. E. HUSSERL'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF R. DESCARTES AND ITS RELATION TO HIS PHENOMENOLOGY

Any comparison of the philosophies of Descartes and Husserl must discuss at least the following issues: firstly, Husserl's acceptance of the Cartesian idea of establishing a "rigorous science of philosophy", secondly, the Cartesian "method of doubt" and its relation to Husserl's "epochē", thirdly, the acceptance of Descartes "transcendental motif",

and finally, Husserl's criticism that Descartes "psychologizes" the ego cogito.

Husserl takes as the underlying "idea guiding [his] meditations ... the Cartesian idea of a science, ultimately an all-embracing science" (E. Husserl, 1973a:7). He accepts the idea of an all-embracing science of philosophy, "a science grounded on an absolute foundation" (ibid.:1) that will provide "a complete reforming of philosophy" (ibid.).

According to Descartes, philosophical knowledge must be absolutely grounded knowledge in the sense that "it must stand upon a foundation of apodictic knowledge whose self-evidence excludes all possible doubt" (E. Husserl, 1970a:75,1973a:14). In addition, every "step of mediate knowledge must be able to attain the same sort of self-evidence" (E. Husserl, 1973a:14). In other words, this grounding must consist of philosophical propositions that are "absolutely certain" (ibid.) or "absolutely indubitable" (ibid.:15). These apodictic propositions must have "apodictic self-evidence" in the sense that this evidence "discloses itself, to a critical reflection, as having the signal peculiarity of being at the same time the absolute unimaginableness (inconceivability) of [its] non-being, and thus excluding in advance every doubt as objectless, empty" (ibid.). However, it should be recognized that while it is "true that the attainment of such an 'absolute standpoint' the idea of non-relative, transcendental truth is essential to Husserl's philosophy ... it plays the role of an unfulfilled telos, a project which gives philosophy its sense" (D. Carr, 1974:277).

Now, the specific kind of "apodictic grounding" offered by both Husserl and Descartes is "an attempt at an absolutely subjectivistic grounding of philosophy through the apodictic ego" (ibid.:199). That is, "starting from absolute cognitive subjecticity", the project is "to undertake an absolute grounding of the sciences..., or (this being the same for Descartes) an absolute grounding of philosophy" (Husserl, 1969b:7).

For Descartes the method for establishing such philosophical knowledge and avoiding prejudice was his "method of doubt". Descartes' method was "to reject as absolutely false all opinions in regard to which [he] could suppose the least ground for doubt, in order to ascertain whether after that there remained aught in belief that was wholly indubitable" (R. Descartes, 1960:27). Consequently, Descartes' method provides the criterion for accepting presuppositions. Whatever was indubitable was to be accepted as apodictic knowledge. For Husserl, on the other hand, the method for approaching the establishment of such knowledge is not the method of doubt but instead consists of a "bracketing" procedure that he calls the "epochē" or the "transcendental-phenomenological reduction". This epochē is a method or operation that "disconnects" the "naive" acceptance of the presupposition that a "spatio-temporal fact-world exists". It is an "inhibiting or putting out of play of all positions taken toward the already given objective world and, in the first place, all existential positions (those concerning being, illusions, possible being, being likely, probable, etc.,..." (E. Husserl, 1973a:20). Husserl's method does not provide the criterion for accepting a proposition but instead functions to place

him at a standpoint where such propositions can become evident.

Husserl claims that his epochē is "extracted" (E. Husserl, 1969a:109) from the Cartesian method of doubt and he criticizes Descartes for failing to see that such an extraction is possible (E. Husserl, 1970a:79). However, Husserl is not interested in beginning with the method of doubt, he is solely interested in extracting the moment of bracketing that is involved in the process of doubting.

Through the Cartesian method of doubt the "meditator keeps only himself, *qua* pure ego of his *cogitationes,* as having an absolutely indubitable existence, as something that cannot be done away with, something that would exist even though this world were non-existent" (E. Husserl, 1973a:3). Husserl, consequently, credits Descartes with seeing "that ego *sum* or *sum cogitans* must be pronounced apodictic" (ibid.:22). As a result, "we get a first apodictically existing basis to stand on" (ibid.), the beginning of a subjectivistic foundation for science.

Consequently, Husserl credits Descartes for having discovered transcendental philosophy with its emphasis on the cogito. He views Descartes as "the primal founder of the transcendental motif... as a radical reflection... on the life of consciousness" [i.e., the cogito] (E. Husserl, 1970a:73). Elsewhere he further states that "transcendental philosophy appears in its primal form, as a seed, in the first Cartesian *Meditations* as an attempt at an absolutely subjectivistic grounding of philosophy through the apodictic ego" (ibid.:199), although he feels that here it is "unclear and ambiguous" (ibid.).

Consequently, he feels that his transcendental phenomenology is "the fulfillment of the tradition of transcendental philosophy presaged by Descartes" (ibid.:97). Therefore, "one might almost call transcendental phenomenology a neo-Cartesianism, even though it is obliged... to reject nearly all the well known doctrinal content of the Cartesian philosophy (E. Husserl, 1973a:1).

Not only is Descartes' transcendental philosophy "unclear and ambiguous", Husserl goes on to criticize the Cartesian transcendental ego - the "centre" of that philosophy - as "psychologistic". In other words, the Cartesian ego is a "substantial" ego. "When [Descartes] says 'I am', 'God is', 'the world is', he does not distinguish in each case the original meaning of the word 'to be'. For him, to be is always to be a substance" (G. Berger, 1972:109). Descartes "misses the proper transcendental sense of the ego he has discovered" (E. Husserl, 1969b:228) since "for Descartes, an absolute evidence makes sure of the ego... as a first, indubitably existing, bit of the world" (ibid.:227). Husserl, on the contrary says that the "ego is not a residuum of the world" (E. Husserl, 1970a:79).

Since the ego is not a residuum or "tag-end" of the world "inferences according to the principle of causality, of the sort used by Descartes, are ruled out" (E. Husserl, 1973a:24). On the contrary, the ego, according to Husserl, has an "intentional relation" to the world not a causal one. In other words, the Cartesian ego cogito, which includes every case of "I perceive, I remember, I fancy, I judge, feel, desire, will, and all experiences of the ego that in any way resemble the foregoing..." (E. Husserl, 1969a:115), in all cases

"intends", refers to, or is directed towards a cogitatum. That is, every cogito or act of consciousness is a consciousness *of* something, and this consciousness of something is the intentional relation. So when the ego remembers, it remembers something, when it judges, it judges something etc., and this something is of the world, so the ego cogito has an intentional relation to the world.

While Husserl criticizes Descartes for the "psychologization" of the transcendental ego he is willing to concede that in Descartes' work there lies an unrecognized and undeveloped concept of the intentionality of consciousness (E. Husserl, 1970a:82-83). However, Husserl argues that Descartes did not appreciate its significance.

As the above discussion has shown, Husserl takes as his underlying goal or ideal the Cartesian idea of an absolute apodictic grounding of science by means of a rigorous science of philosophy. Descartes tries to achieve this through the method of systemic doubt. Similarly, Husserl "extracts" from this method the "moment" of an epochē which is to serve as the method for the attainment of a standpoint where certain knowledge can become evident. Here he credits Descartes with having discovered the cogito as having a certain existence which therefore can serve as an apodictic ground for science and philosophy. Consequently, Husserl credits Descartes for having discovered transcendental philosophy with its emphasis on the cogito. However, Husserl is critical of Descartes in that he feels that Descartes did not have a "clear and distinct" understanding of the transcendental motif. This is so because Descartes "psychologizes" or "substantializes" the ego. Consequently, Descartes is unable to see the "intentional relation"

this ego has to the world since he views this as a causal relation and Husserl again is critical of Descartes for this shortcoming. In spite of this he acknowledges that the concept of intentionality is implicit in Descartes' writings even though Descartes did not see it.

2. E. HUSSERL'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF I. KANT AND ITS RELATION TO HIS PHENOMENOLOGY

In order to attain an understanding of the relationship between Husserl's and Kant's philosophies it is necessary to discuss at least three areas: one, the similarity in philosophical orientation, two, the apparent terminological similarity, and three, Husserl's criticism of Kant's philosophy.

Both Husserl and Kant take a specifically transcendental approach to philosophy. While a contrast seems at first apparent between Kant's and Husserl's transcendental orientation, a closer examination reveals a similarity. While both emphasize a transcendental motif, in the sense of an orientation towards the conditions of knowing, an apparent contrast presents itself. Whereas Kant emphasizes the "principles", or "pure concepts" or "rules" by which these conditions or "categories" operate Husserl emphasizes "acts of consciousness" or "subjective acts" (E. Husserl, 1969a:115) that are the conditions of knowing. However, as David Carr points out, this is only a "difference of emphasis" (1974:32). "Kant's 'rules' after all, are rules for doing something - judging or synthesizing - and Kant does not fail to use the term 'consciousness' for the agent of synthesis". Furthermore, Husserl uses the term "principles" (1969b:16) and "rules" (1969a:413) in conjunction with the "constitutional function" of

transcendental consciousness (which is a synthesizing process). Consequently, the basic turn towards the subjective categories of knowing is common to both Husserl and Kant.

Alternatively expressed, Husserl accepts Kant's "Copernican turn" in philosophy. This "turn" or shift claims that "hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects" (I. Kant, 1929:22). Instead, "we must... make trial whether we may not have more success... if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge" (ibid.), when knowledge is in the form of "laws [dictated] ā priori to appearances, and therefore to nature, the sum of all appearances" (ibid.:172). Again elsewhere in the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant speaks of "transcendental knowledge" as "occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects, insofar as this mode of knowlege is to be possible ā priori" (ibid.:59). However, Husserl feels that Kant did not have "a clear and genuine sense of the transcendental turn to be carried out and of its method of work" (1970:199). What this means is that, according to Husserl, Kant did not have a "clear and genuine sense" of the "transcendental reduction" (ibid.).[1]

The relationship between the philosophies of Husserl and Kant can be further amplified through a comparison of some of the terms that both share within this similarity of basic orientation. Due to the fact that many of the terms that Husserl uses are ones that were also used by Kant, an apparent similarity of concepts seems to exist between Husserl and Kant. However, a closer examination reveals that the same terms are used for strikingly different meanings. In

fact, Husserl in a letter to A. Metzger goes so far as to say that Kant influenced him hardly at all (M. Farber, 1943:17). This is partly due to the fact that Husserl felt that "the undoubtedly great discoveries in [Kant's] theories are there only in concealment, that is, they are not there as finished results" (E. Husserl, 1970:103). He consequently views Kant's philosophizing as rather "constructed" (ibid.:199) and "unintelligible" and consequently not useful for the purposes of developing a phenomenological philosophy. So in spite of an apparent similarity of concepts Husserl has little sympathy for Kantian transcendental philosophy.

If one examines some of these "apparently similar" concepts a sense of the difference between Kant's philosophy and Husserl's philosophy emerges. For example, an examination of the terms "transcendental" and "transcendent" as used by Husserl and Kant is instructive in this context. Although the term "transcendental" is used basically in the same way in both philosophies, in the sense of the conditions of knowledge, the way in which it is defined in relation to other terms reveals a different context within which the concept must be understood. For Kant, the word "transcendental", "does not signify something passing beyond all experience but something that indeed precedes it ā priori, but that is intended simply to make knowledge of experience possible. If these conceptions overstep experience, their employment is termed transcendent..." (I. Kant, 1950:123). In other words, the term "transcendent" for Kant means going "beyond the limits of experience" (ibid.:76) whereas the term "transcendental" means "lying at the basis of experience" (ibid.:XVIII).

Kant's transcendental "categories" transcend experience only in the sense that the categories constitute, and thus are logically prior to, experience. So, for Kant there is no "cognitive relationship" (D. Carr, 1974:5) between the transcendental and the transcendent. There is, however, a relationship between the transcendental and experience in the sense that the transcendental makes experience possible. Now, if we compare Husserl we find that there is specifically a cognitive relationship between the transcendental and the transcendent. In fact, this points to the cental characteristic of transcendental consciousness which is precisely the cognitive relation between the transcendental and the transcendent. That is to say, transcendental consciousness is characterized by the property "intentionality" which specifically points to a cognitive relation between transcendental consciousness and the transcendent. It points to the fact that transcendental consciousness is always a "consciousness of something" (E. Husserl, 1973a:33), that is, it is always a consciousness of something that transcends consciousness, thus revealing the "cognitive relationship" between the transcendental and the transcendent in Husserl's philosophy. So for Husserl the word "transcendent" refers to whatever is not "to be found in my conscious life" (ibid.:26). Or, more positively, "this transcendence is part of the intrinsic sense of anything worldly" (ibid.). That is to say, the transcendent does not refer to acts of consciousness but to those things towards which those acts point. So for Husserl the transcendental and the transcendent are "cognitively related" through the concept of "intentionality", whereas no such relationship exists between the transcendental and

the transcendent in Kant's philosophy. Here consequently, an identical vocabulary conceals a significant contrast of sense between the usages of the two philosophies.

Similarly, the term "ā priori" conceals a "significant contrast of sense". According to Kant, "we shall understand by ā priori knowledge, not knowledge independent of this or that experience, but knowledge absolutely independent of all experience" (1929:43). "The ā priori which is thus logically prior to experience, and which constitutes its possibility consequently becomes inaccessible to experience" (G. Berger, 1972:96). Whereas for Husserl, on the other hand, the ā priori is accessible to experience (ibid.). This is so because Husserl's "essences" are accessible to experience (ibid.) and essences are identified with the ā priori, as the following quotation from Husserl's *Formal and Transcendental Logic* indicates:

> ... the concept *eidos* [essence] is... given a maximally broad sense.... [This] sense defines the only concept belonging to the multisignificant expression, *ā priori*, that I recognize philosophically. That concept alone is meant wherever the locution *ā priori* occurs in my writings (248).

However, Husserl does preserve the Kantian characteristic of "certainty" in his definition of the term ā priori.[2]

As Robert Sokolowski argues in his *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution* (1970:216), the difference between the two usages of the term "ā priori" is further demonstrated in the discussions of the "process of constitution". In Kant's constitutional process, the "ā priori categories" exist prior to encounter in a "rigid and predetermined" manner and are imposed upon "sensation" thereby "constituting" the object, and this entire process occurs within

subjectivity. In contrast, Husserl's "ā priori" categories or essences are not presumed to exist beforehand in the Kantian fashion, but on the other hand arise only in and through sensational encounter and are consequently, in a sense, the "result" of the process of constitution. Also, since these sensational encounters can vary the "result" (the ā priori, essence) can also vary, thus making Husserl's ā priori categories less "rigid and predetermined". Furthermore, these categories or essences are not "in subjectivity", in the Kantian fashion, but instead it is subjectivity itself, through "acts of consciousness" that constitutes the objective ā priori categories.

Finally, some discussion must be devoted to a comparison of a group of terms that appear to yield themselves to possible confusion. This group includes the terms: "phenomena", "thing-in-itself (noumena)", and "thing-itself". Husserl's usage of the slogan "to the things themselves", frequently found throughout his writings (e.g. 1970a:199), must not be confused with the Kantian "thing-in-itself" (noumena) but instead refers to the "phenomenological" orientation of Husserl's philosophy.

Husserl's phenomenological orientation is captured in his characterization of what he calls "the principle of all principles". This doctrine asserts that "no theory we can conceive can mislead us in regard to the *principle of all principles:* that *every primordial dator Intuition is a source of authority (Rechtsquelle) for knowledge,* that *whatever presents itself in "intuition" in primordial form* (as it were in its bodily reality), *is simply to be accepted as it gives itself*

out to be, though only within the limits in which it then presents itself" (E. Husserl, 1969a:92). "Whatever presents itself in intuition in primordial form" is the world of phenomena.

There is a similarity of use in the term "phenomena" for both Husserl and Kant, and Husserl even admits that Kant's *"Critique of Pure Reason...* moves strictly on phenomenological ground" (ibid.:183). However, Kant's usage of the term "phenomena" refers to "the things of sense, or appearances" (I. Kant, 1950:61), i.e., appearances that reflect an underlying reality (noumena). In Kant's words, since the "... world of sense contains merely appearances, which are not things in themselves... the understanding, because it recognizes that the objects of experience are mere appearances, must assume that there are things in themselves, namely, noumena" (ibid.:109). While Husserl does accept "appearances" or more specifically, "the meant purely as meant" (E. Husserl, 1973a:56) his philosophy is "not a Kantian idealism, which believes it can keep open, at least as a limiting concept, the possibility of a world of things-in-themselves" (ibid.:86) or "hyperbolical objects" or "noumena" that are "represented" by the "categories" (I. Kant, 1950:80). Husserl rejects such a conception as incomprehensible. "All the transcendental concepts of Kant..." [as for example] ... that of the 'thing in itself'... are constructive concepts which resist in principle an ultimate clarification" (E. Husserl, 1970a:199). Consequently, while a similarity exists in the two usages of the term "phenomena" this cannot be said of the terms "thing-in-itself" ("noumena") and "thing-itself" or "things-themselves" (phenomena).

As mentioned earlier, Husserl was far from impressed with the

achievements of Kantian philosophy. While he characterized his own philosophy as transcendental idealism (E. Husserl, 1973a:83) he had little sympathy for what he regarded as the "mythical concept constructions" (E. Husserl, 1970a:199) and the "ultimate incomprehensibility" (ibid.:200) of Kantian philosophy.

In addition to claiming that Kant's philosophy is "ultimately incomprehensible", Husserl accuses it of accepting "an unquestioned ground of presuppositions which codetermine the meaning of [its] questions" (ibid.:104). Firstly, Husserl criticizes Kant's philosophy for presupposing the validity of "mathematical natural science and of pure mathematics" (ibid.). Kant simply takes these sciences for granted and in fact takes the existence of the synthetic ā priori judgments in these sciences for granted and aks about how they are possible. Since "mathematical judgments, without exception, are synthetic" (I. Kant, 1929:52) and since Newtonian physics "contains ā priori synthetic judgments as principles" (ibid.:54) Kant arrives at the fundamental question of his philosophy which is: "how are ā priori synthetic judgments possible" (ibid.:55)? It is Husserl's criticism that to presuppose the validity of the existing sciences is to introduce a rather unphenomenological slant into one's philosophy since it uncritically accepts the constructed objects and the concepts of science as the official version of reality. Instead, according to Husserl, phenomenology must, in opposition to this tendency, go directly to "whatever presents itself in intuition in primordial form" (E. Husserl, 1969a:92). It must go directly to the "phenomena" that are presupposed by such objects and concepts.

Secondly, Husserl claims that "... from the very start in the Kantian manner of posing questions, the every day surrounding world of life is presupposed as existing - the surrounding world in which all of us (even I who am now philosophizing) consciously have our existence..." (E. Husserl, 1970a:104). Husserl claims that such a presupposition is difficult if not impossible to justify "apodictically" (1969a:145). Husserl, who aspires to "apodicticity", takes care of this presupposition by placing it in "brackets", by refusing to either affirm or deny its validity. Furthermore, it is precisely this bracketing, or what Husserl calls the "epochē", that permits Husserl to make what he feels is a complete "Copernican turn" to transcendental subjectivity - which Kant, consequently did not effect - at least according to Husserl. It is because Kantian philosophy accepts such presuppositions as a basis for its propositions that "a true beginning, achieved by means of a radical liberation from all scientific and prescientific traditions, was not achieved by Kant" (E. Husserl, 1970a:199).

Instead of accepting the fact of science, i.e. taking existing sciences as valid, Husserl without apparent justification, accepts the ideal of science provided by Descartes - the "ideal" of a presuppositionless, absolute, rigorous science of philosophy (E. Husserl, 1973a:7). So instead of accepting the existing scientific tradition he wishes to develop a science that grounds itself, that is self-evident and certain or apodictic, following the Cartesian ideal. Whatever presuppositions that Husserl will accept must have been examined from the standpoint of his philosophy and rejected or accepted

as apodictic. That is, they must be established through an appeal to the pre-scientific data, through an appeal to the "things-themselves" (phenomena).

Another fundamental criticism that Husserl directs towards Kantian philosophy is that it is not truly philosophy but in fact psychology (E. Husserl, 1969a:183). Kant's transcendental subject, in other words, is a "human ego", a "human being". It is Husserl's contention that such "human being" must be examined for its presuppositions. It cannot simply be presupposed as part of one's philosophy. In other words, the possibility of "human being" must itself be confronted. One must ask about the "constitution" of "human being" as such. Transcendental subjectivity, for Husserl, is not "in the world" as "human beings" are but is instead beyond the world in the sense that the world presupposes such being for its possibility. In the *Cartesian Meditations* he writes:

> neither the world nor any worldly object is a piece of my ego, to be found in my conscious life as a really inherent part of it, as a complex of data of sensation or a complex of acts. This "transcendence" is part of the intrinsic sense of anything worldly (26).

Elsewhere he also writes that the term "transcendental" is used to describe consciousness because of its "wonderful capacity" to intend something "that stands over against consciousness itself, something that is other in principle, something not part of it, something transcendent" (E. Husserl, 1969a:285).

In conclusion, while a terminological similarity does indeed exist between the philosophies of Husserl and Kant it has been shown that the various terms characteristic of a transcendental philosophy

receive different interpretations in these two philosophies. While Husserl is not impressed with Kant's philosophical achievements he does recognize that Kant's philosophy did influence him to some extent (E. Husserl, 1970a:97). He does in places concede the fruitfulness of Kant's intentions or at least general orientation. Husserl's *Idea of Phenomenology*, for example, was written after an intensive study of Kant's philosophy (D. Carr, 1974:XXI). Elsewhere, also, in Husserl's *Ideas* he points out that Kant was really the first to tread on "phenomenological soil", although his psychologistic leanings forced him to misinterpret the significance of such a discovery (1969a: 183). So while Husserl acknowledges Kant's influence he is severly critical of his actual achievements.

3. E. HUSSERL'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF D. HUME AND ITS RELATION TO HIS PHENOMENOLOGY

Any discussion of the relation between Husserl's interpretation of the philosophy of D. Hume and Husserl's phenomenology must cover the definition of the "constitutional problem set" that he feels is present in Hume's philosophy, and which, according to Husserl gives Hume's philosophy its "greatness". In addition, it must include Husserl's criticism of Hume's attempt at the specification of the constitutional problem set as a "naturalistic sensationalism" and "fictionalism" that results in the "bankruptcy of philosophy and science".

According to Husserl, Hume "was the first to treat seriously the Cartesian focusing purely on what lies inside" (1969b:256). Husserl felt that it is because of this focus, and Hume's development of it, that his philosophy deserves to be closely scrutinized.

What "lies inside" for Hume is "the soul [or the "mind"] as a field of perceptions ("impressions" and "ideas")[3]... as a datum of a suitably purified internal experience" (ibid.); that is, this "mind" cannot be considered as "distinct from the particular perceptions" (D. Hume, 1896:635) that make it up.

Considering the above focus upon "what lies inside", i.e. "perceptions", Hume, like Descartes and Kant, can be argued to have effected what has come to be known as the "Copernican turn" in philosophy. The Copernican turn in philosophy is the turn to the subjective conditions of knowledge, to "our mode of knowledge of objects" (I. Kant, 1929:59). As N. Capaldi states (1975:81), Hume's "Copernican thesis" shows itself when he claims that "... to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security" (D. Hume, 1896:XX). However, like his criticism of Kant, Husserl feels that Hume did not "consciously practise - to say nothing of thinking out radically - the method of phenomenological reduction" (E. Husserl, 1969b:256) which is necessary to the possibility of a complete Copernican turn to transcendental subjectivity.

Like Descartes' attempt to ground science in transcendental subjectivity, Hume also assumes the Cartesian goal of founding science in subjectivity or "the principles of human nature" (D. Hume, 1896:XX) as Hume calls it. So it can be seen that it is not only from Descartes that Husserl takes the goal of his philosophy. He is further motivated by Hume's acceptance of this Cartesian ideal

and his respect for Hume's philosophical achievements.

However, Hume's greatness does not lie in the mere acceptance of the Cartesian focusing on "what lies inside". "Hume's greatness (a greatness still unrecognized in this, its most important aspect) lies in the fact that... he was the first to grasp the universal concrete problem of transcendental philosophy" (ibid.). This "universal concrete problem of transcendental philosophy" is what Husserl calls the problem of the "subjective constitution of objectivity". Hume for the first time saw "the necessity of making it possible to understand how it happens that, purely within this phenomenologically reduced subjectivity and its immanent genesis, this same subjectivity can find, in a supposed 'experience', transcendent objectivities - realities with the ontological forms (space, time, continuum, physical things, personality) that we already take for granted" (ibid.). In other words, "Hume was the first to see the necessity of investigating the objective itself as a product of its genesis from... ["the concreteness of pure egological internality"] in order to make the legitimate being - sense of everything that exists for us intelligible through its ultimate origins" (ibid.). Husserl refers to the "concreteness" of egological internality because it is out of Hume's actual experienced "ideas and impressions" that objects are constituted. It is through the examination of actual "states of consciousness and the operation of the mind... and the [avoidance] of metaphysical hypotheses" (S. Bachelard, 1968:198) that objects are constituted. Consequently, Hume, for the first time, destroys the "naive objectivism" that did

not see the constitutional process as a problem (ibid.).

Hume's "constitutional problem" arises out of the position that "objects" are composed of a multiplicity of "distinct sensible qualities" (D. Hume, 1896:219). Within this multiplicity of sense data the "identity" of the object, that arises in "our common way of thinking" (ibid.:253), must somehow be explained. "We have a distinct idea of an object, that remains invariable and uninterrupted thro' a suppos'd variation of time; and this idea we call that of *identity* or *sameness*" (ibid.). This idea of identity of a body arises out of the "constant union with each other" of the "several distinct sensible qualities" (ibid.:219). So Hume explains this "identity or sameness" of objects, that arises in "our common way of thinking", by pointing to the fact that the "mind" arrives at the "idea" of the identity of an object when it surveys, without interruption, the "constant union of distinct sensible qualities". This idea is transferred to the situation in which there are "interrupted" images or "impressions" that resemble, but are not identical with one another. "The smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought, being alike in both cases, deceives the mind, and makes us ascribe an identity to the changeable succession of connected qualities" (ibid.). In other words, because the former uninterrupted impression of sensible qualities resembles the latter interrupted impression of sensible qualities, the latter impression is also, mistakenly, constituted as an identical object. "The smooth passage of the imagination along the ideas of the resembling perceptions makes us ascribe to them a perfect identity" (ibid.:205). Thus there is "a propension to unite

these broken appearances by the fiction of a continu'd existence" (ibid.).

Such is Husserl's definition of the constitutional process inherent in Hume's philosophy. However, while Husserl praises Hume for his discovery of the constitutional problem-set, he is critical of Hume's conceptualization of it. This is because Hume did not see that the constitutional process involves the concept of the "intentional" structure of subjectivity (as introduced above). Hume, the "first discoverer of constitutional problems, completely overlooked the fundamental essential property of mental life as a life of consciousness, the very property to which these problems relate... [the property of] intentionality" (E. Husserl, 1969b:257). This oversight, according to Husserl, was due to "his naturalistic sensualism, which could see only a collection of data floating in an unsubstantial void" (ibid.), a "collection of data - which come and perish, cast together now in this way and now in that, according to a senseless accidental regularity... " (ibid.:255). Because of this, Hume "was blind to the objectivating function of intentional synthesis... " (ibid.:257).

Such a conception of "mental life" results in what Husserl calls a "countersensical fictionalism" (ibid.:255) where general categories that describe objects are "fictions" constructed through the constant association or union of simple or particular "ideas" that are based, in turn, upon the constant union or association of simple or particular "impressions". There are "only particular individual ideas and the attendant habits, by which our general thinking is supposed to be

explained as merely a thinking about individual ideas" (ibid.: 260). Since there are "only particular individual ideas", and since "general" or categorical thinking is based on habitual associations of particular ideas, "all categories of objectivity - the scientific ones through which an objective extrapsychic world is thought in scientific life, and the prescientific ones through which it is thought in everyday life - are fictions" (E. Husserl, 1970a:87). Consequently, Hume's philosophy, according to Husserl, results in a "countersensical fictionalism" (E. Husserl, 1969b:255), a fictionalism that results in what Husserl calls the "bankruptcy of philosophy and science" (ibid.) since it makes the general categories of philosophy and science mere habitual, arbitrary constructions.

In order to understand the relation between Hume and Husserl, from the standpoint of Husserl's own interpretation of this relation, it was necessary to discuss Hume's "Copernican turn" to subjectivity since it is Hume's particular version of this turn that accounts for his "greatness". According to Husserl, Hume was the first to formulate the problem of the "subjective constitution of objectivity". The theory of constitution according to many commentators, (e.g. R. Sokolowski, 1970:V,39; M. Natanson, 1973:13; G. Berger, 1972:9) is the central conception of Husserl's phenomenology, thus making Hume a major forerunner of Husserl's phenomenology. However, Husserl criticizes Hume for his conception of consciousness (the "mind" or "soul") as a "collection of data - which come and perish, cast together... according to a senseless accidental regularity" (E. Husserl, 1969b:255) - his "naturalistic sensualism". Consequently, Husserl

criticizes Hume for having overlooked the central property of consciousness upon which the problem of constitution is based, the property of "intentionality", and for having developed a "fictionalistic" theory of the subjective constitution of objectivity as a result.

FOOTNOTES

1. The "transcendental reduction" or "epochē" is the operation that Husserl claims is necessary to the assumption of a transcendental perspective. It will be discussed further in Chapter Three below.

2. Kant announces in his *Prolegomena*: "everything that is to be known a priori is thereby announced as apodictically certain... " (1950:118).

3. Hume states that "all the perceptions of the human mind [or "soul"] resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which... [he calls] impressions and ideas" (1896:I). Hume defines "impressions" as the experience we have in the presence of external objects or internal physiological states and he defines "ideas" as the "images" or later thoughts or memories we have of the original experience itself.

CHAPTER TWO: INTRODUCTION TO THE IDEA OF A FOUNDATION

The purpose of this chapter is to present a *preliminary* idea of what Husserl means by a *foundation*. I refer to it as "preliminary" because the effect of the following three chapters will be to provide an exposition of the idea of a foundation that is not "preliminary" in nature (i.e., it is not preliminary to another exposition to follow). Since the framework to be presented in subsequent chapters is foundational in character, a more complete idea of the nature of a foundation can only be arrived at after the framework itself has been studied and understood. Consequently, this discussion is intended merely to provide a brief introduction to the idea of a foundation.

An introduction to the idea of a foundation at this point in the discussion seems useful because it is the idea of a foundation which is the telos that both the "framework" (to be presented in the next three chapters) and Husserl's phenomenology tends towards. Consequently, since this telos gives sense to this "framework", and, therefore lends sense to the thesis as a whole, some idea of the nature of a phenomenological foundation, at this point, seems useful.

1. HUSSERL'S PROBLEM: THE CRISIS OF SCIENCE

The general problem with the "European sciences" (which for Husserl include mathematics and logic) is that they do not understand their own objects or concepts (E. Husserl, 1969b:13-15). According to Husserl, this is because of the overwhelming reliance upon "technique" (ibid.:3). This preoccupation with technical manipulation has directed attention away from the development of "insight into the ratio of its accomplished production" (ibid.). Herein lies what

Husserl calls the "crisis" of the European sciences".

According to Husserl, the "European sciences" are "unable to say (in the true and ultimate sense) what sense belongs to the existent of which they speak or what sense - horizons that existent presupposes" (ibid.:13). Consequently, the "sciences are... completely in the dark about their own sense" (ibid.:16).

What this "darkness" regarding "their own sense" implies is that "the sciences, after three centuries of brilliant development, are now feeling hampered by obscurities... in their fundamental concepts and methods" (E. Husserl, 1973a:4). This reveals itself in the fact that in "every science" there exists a "controversy" as to the "true sense of its fundamental concepts" (E. Husserl, 1969b:16).

Quoting Lotze, Husserl states that the highest task of science is "not merely to calculate the course of the world, but to understand it" (ibid.:15). The charge is that the "European sciences" do not "understand" the objects of their study since they are busied with the "calculation" of their "course". The point here is that the "obscurities" and the resulting "contraversies" result from the excessive reliance upon such "calculation" or "technique". "Science, in the form of special science, has become a sort of theoretical technique, which, like technique in the usual sense, depends on 'practical experience' accruing from many-sided and often-exercised practical activity itself - or what, in the realm of practice, is called... a knack, or good practical eye... (ibid.:13). This excessive reliance on technique, usually "symbolical and mathematical method" (E. Husserl, 1965:147), and the products of this technical process

means that "the sciences"... own productions... are unable to clarify the genuine being - sense of either their provinces or the concepts that comprehend their provinces" (E. Husserl, 1969b:13). The argument is that simple reliance on technique cannot clarify "the genuine being-sense" of anything at all. So, Husserl explains why the sciences are "completely in the dark about their own sense" by pointing to the reliance of the European sciences upon "practical technique".

Since scientists are "unable to say what sense belongs to the existent of which they speak" (ibid.) Husserl draws the conclusion that "men live entirely in a world that has become unintelligible, in which they ask in vain for the wherefore, the sense... " (ibid.:5). This creates a "spiritual need of our time" (E. Husserl, 1965:140) to make the world intelligible through the clarification of our fundamental concepts and methods, i.e., through the establishment of a foundation for European science. That European science lacks such a foundation is the "crisis", the great "tragedy of modern scientific culture" (E. Husserl, 1969b:3).

2. HUSSERL'S SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS

This crisis in the foundation "of European science necessitates radical investigations of sense" (ibid.:5). That is, the "existents" to which the sciences refer must be examined as to their "sense" in order to clarify the fundamental concepts and methods that presuppose these existents. So, it is "applied phenomenology" that must supply "the definitive criticism of every fundamentally distinct science, and in particular there with the final determination of the sense in

which their objects can be said to be" (E. Husserl, 1969a:183). It is through such "phenomenological criticism", therefore, that the fundamental concepts and methods of every science can be clarified. This clarified outcome is expected to function as a phenomenological foundation for the science or sciences under "investigation".

Consider, for example, the investigation of the sense of "psychological methodology". Applied phenomenology must serve as the critical

> court of appeal for the fundamental questions of psychological methodology. The general conclusions which it has reached must be recognized and... adopted by the psychologist as the condition for the possibility of all further developments of method in his field. What conflicts with it bears the stamp of intrinsic psychological absurdity... (ibid.:231).

For Husserl, what this business of the establishment of a foundation through radical sense investigations means is that science must be grounded in "transcendental subjectivity". In other words, the aim is "to find in transcendental subjectivity the deepest grounding of all science" (E. Husserl, 1973a:27). The term "transcendental" points to the "motif of a universal philosophy which is grounded purely in ... the knower's reflecting upon himself and his knowing life" (E. Husserl, 1970a:97-98). This focusing upon the knower's knowing life amounts to a focusing upon "my I" - "my ego" and its "conscious life". In addition, this transcendental motif includes a focusing upon "the relation of... my 'I' - the 'ego' [and its conscious life] to the world of which I am conscious"(ibid.:98).[1]

This transcendental orientation is necessary due to the "one-sided" (E. Husserl, 1969b:4) emphasis on "technique" and consequently

due to the one-sided emphasis on the products of this technical process. This one-sided emphasis on technical products and productions, at the same time, implies a de-emphasis of "the *ratio* of its accomplished production" (ibid.) i.e., a de-emphasis on the transcendental subjective "origins" of these accomplishments. What this means is that the European sciences do not have an insight into transcendental subjectivity and the role it plays in the knowing process.

To repeat: what has happened, according to Husserl, is that due to the excessice emphasis on practical technique a rather "one-sided" emphasis on the "products" of science has emerged. This focus on the "product" of science, which in turn emphasizes the "technical productive" process, has ignored the possibility of a parallel focus on the "subjective origin" or "*ratio*" of its accomplished production. It is this one-sided emphasis on the product of a technical productive process that has prevented the sciences from clarifying their own sense since they, consequently, are unable to focus on the "subjective origin" of this sense. Consequently, radical sense investigations that probe into the transcendental subjective origin of the sense of the various existents, that the sciences presuppose, are necessary.

The problem of grounding science in transcendental subjectivity is also related to the problem of completely reforming "philosophy [following the Cartesian ideal] into a science grounded on an absolute foundation" (E. Husserl, 1973a:1) i.e., into a transcendental phenomenology. That is, philosophy, as transcendental phenomenology, must be self-grounding in the sense of working "from the bottom in self-evident single steps" (E. Husserl, 1970a:192). This self-grounded

transcendental phenomenology must also provide a grounding or foundational function for the other sciences.

This self-grounded transcendental phenomenology must be "grounded on an absolute foundation" (E. Husserl, 1973a:1). In other words, this transcendental phenomenology must provide an "apodictic" (absolute) basis for itself as well as the other sciences. The ideal of apodicticity or absoluteness means that the statements of transcendental phenomenology must exclude all doubt, "they must carry with them an absolute certainty" (ibid.:14), i.e., "absolute indubitability" (ibid.: 15). "Apodictic evidence", according to Husserl, has the "signal peculiarity of being... the absolute imaginableness (inconceivability) of their non-being... " (ibid.:16). This is, as is plainly evident, the "Cartesian principle for building genuine science: the principle of absolute indubitability... " (ibid.). It is the abandonment of this ideal of certainty with its correlative preoccupation with mathematizing or formalizing technique that contributes to the "crisis of European science".

This abandonment of the ideal of apodicticity means that "modern science has abandoned the ideal of genuine science... . No longer is its inmost driving force that radicalness which unremittingly imposes on itself the demand to accept no knowledge that cannot be accounted for by originally first principles, which are at the same time matters of perfect insight..." (E. Husserl, 1969b:3,4). This abandonment of the ideal of apodicticity "evinces a tradgedy of modern scientific culture... [which] concerns, not the collective unifying and appropriating of the sciences, but their rootedness in principles"

(ibid.:3). It is the task of transcendental phenomenology to deal with this "tragedy" by bringing "to light the system of transcendental principles that give to sciences the... sense of genuine sciences" (ibid.:16).

These apodictic principles are expected to give the sciences the "sense of genuine sciences" by providing rules or norms that make the experience of their existents possible. For example, in the case of the "thing-world", the apodictic principle or "essence" that "all material things are extended" (E. Husserl, 1969a:61,415) prescribes a rule or norm for all experiences of all possible "things".[2] Any statements that violate this "eidetic" (i.e., essential) rule results in an assertion that is "intrinsically absurd". For example, "in the physical sphere every conflict with geometrical truths... bears the stamp of intrinsic absurdity in natural science" (ibid.:231). This is because Husserl views "geometric axioms as primitive laws of essential being" (ibid.:204). In general, Husserl claims that "every experience [including the experience of a material thing] has its own essence" (ibid.:116). Such essences or rules are the "principles which... function as norms governing the whole enterprise of empirical science" (E. Husserl, 1964a:46).

It should be made clear at this point that the principles here cited as examples, i.e., the geometric principles, and the principle regarding the experience of any material thing must themselves be grounded in transcendental subjectivity. For example, the essential truth that "all material things are extended" must itself be grounded in subjective principles by asking about what subjective "acts" (e.g.

belief, valuation, retention, etc) are essential to the possibility of the experience of a material thing - as "extended".

The above discussion has indicated that a foundation for science and philosophy must assume the form of "first principles" or "essences" ("rules", "norms"). This eidetic (essential) component refers to "the invariant, the indissolubly identical in the different and ever again different, the essence common to all, the universal essence by which all 'imaginable' variants... are restricted. This invariant is the ontic essential form (a priori form), the eidos... " (E. Husserl, 1969b:248).

An essence or an essential relation can be discovered through the "free variation" (also called the "eidetic reduction" or "eidetic abstraction") in "phantasy" of one or more examples of the object being studied. "It belongs to the general and essential nature of immediate, intuitive essence - apprehension... that it can be carried out on the basis of the mere present framing of particular illustrations" (E. Husserl, 1969a:198). In the "eidetic abstraction" (E. Husserl, 1964a:6) of essential relations the geometer, for example, as an eidetic scientist, "is restricted" if he actually draws or actually constructs an example (E. Huuserl, 1969a:199). On the other hand "in phantasy he has incomparable freedom in the arbitrary transformation of the phantasied figures... , a freedom that alone opens up for him access to the world of essential possibilities with their infinite horizons of eidetic cognitions" (ibid.:199-200). Through such free-variation (or eidetic reduction) properties of the example are revealed which necessarily persist through all variations of the

example (E. Husserl, 1969b:248). These persistent properties are the eidetic properties without which an object of the kind in question cannot be conceived.

In Husserl's words:

> [if] in the play of fancy we bring spatial shapes of one sort or another to birth, melodies, social happenings, and so forth, or live through ficticious acts of everyday life, of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, of volition and the like, we can through 'ideation' [free-variation] secure from this source... insight into pure essences in manifold variety: essences, it may be, of spatial shape in general, of melody as such, of social happenings as such, and so forth... (E. Husserl, 1969a:57).

So through the free-variation of an example, "in the place of which any variant of the example could have served equally well" (E. Husserl, 1969b:248), the phenomenologist must "abstract" its essential structure. That is, whatever "in purely invariant and reduced form is peculiar to the experience and cannot be thought away from it, as it is in itself,... passes *eo ipso* into the *eidos*... " (E. Husserl, 1969a:261). Since only the invariant properties are *eidetic* it is clear that "phenomenology ignores... the individual element" (ibid.:209), that is, it ignores whatever makes an object unique amongst other objects of its kind. In other words, "... in the sphere of the essence there are no accidents; everything is connected through essential relations ..."(ibid.:272).

So the phenomenologist is not content with the empirical scientific "prediction" of events, he is interested in essences or essential relations, or what amounts to the same thing, he is interested in the possibility of whatever he is studying. The phenomenologist "is not content with the fact that we find our way about in the world,

that we have legal formulae which enable us to predict the future course of things, or to reconstruct its past course: he wants to clarify the essence of a thing, an event, a cause, an effect, of space, of time, etc., as well as... the essence of thought, which enables it to be thought" (E. Husserl, 1970b:245). For example, "if science constructs theories in the systematic dispatch of its problems, the philosopher enquires into the essence of theory and what makes theory as such possible" (ibid.). So by addressing the problem of the essence of something Husserl addresses the problem of its possibility. As Husserl puts it: "... the question of the possibility of experience... is... at the same time... the question of the essence of experience" (E. Husserl, 1964a:27). This points to the "old ontological doctrine, that the knowledge of 'possibilities' must precede that of actualities (*Wirklichkeiten*)... " (E. Husserl, 1969a:232), and is in Husserl's opinion, "insofar as it is rightly understood and properly utilized, a really great truth" (ibid.).

Also, by addressing the problem of the essence of something, in the context of its possibility, the problem of its foundation is also approached. In other words, the essential properties of, say, a material thing, make it possible (i.e., conceivable), and all actual material things, as studied by empirical physical science, therefore, get their sense and guidance (i.e., foundation) from this eidetic definition. This is because such eidetic definitions are the "principles which... function as norms governing the whole enterprise of empirical science" (E. Husserl, 1964a:46).

So, in general, as Merleau-Ponty nicely summarizes: the problem

is "to give a new account of how... philosophy, science, and the sciences of man... might be possible" (M. Merleau-Ponty, 1964:44). In other words, it is "necessary once again to think them through to their foundations" (ibid.). The expectation is that through such a foundation the "unintelligibility" of "the world" in which men live and "in which they ask in vain for the wherefore, the sense... " (E. Husserl, 1969b:5) can be reduced. In other words, the expectation is that such a phenomenological foundation will fulfill "this spiritual need of our time" (E. Husserl, 1965:140). The expectation is that such a phenomenological foundation will deal with the "crisis of European science", the "tragedy of modern scientific culture" (E. Husserl, 1969b:3).

This foundation

> ... was not expected to spring forth complete and full panoplied from the head of some creative genius... . Instead, it was expected to emerge after the gigantic preparatory work of generations... working from the ground up with a foundation free of doubt and [rising] up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon stone, each as solid as the other... (E. Husserl, 1965:75-76).

It is the task of this thesis to provide an introduction to a phenomenological framework that makes the establishment of a phenomenological foundation for interpretive sociology possible. In other words, it is the aim of this thesis to contribute to the "construction" of this foundation by introducing a phenomenological framework that contributes to making the establishment of a phenomenological foundation for interpretive sociology a possibility. This is to be achieved by specifying in and through this framework, the presuppositions necessary to such a foundation and by giving a preliminary indication of how these

presuppositions can be "filled out" or "applied" to the foundational problems of interpretive sociology. Through the specification of such a framework and its preliminary application, it is hoped that the meaning of the foundational problems to be solved in this "domain" can be revealed.

FOOTNOTES

1. This latter aspect of the transcendental motif will become more intelligible in Chapter Four below when the concept of "intentionality" is introduced.

In addition, since transcendental phenomenology is interested in the *relation* between conscious life and the world, it is *not* an introspective psychology that focuses exclusively upon what "lies inside".

2. The repeated reference to the problem of the possibility of "existents" i.e., "things", "accomplishments" etc., and on "the *ratio* of their accomplished production" indicates that "phenomenological explication does nothing but explicate the sense this world has for us all, prior to any philosophizing... , a sense which philosophy can uncover but never alter" (E. Husserl, 1973b:151). So the "sense investigations" referred to above do not try to replace our "natural experiences" but merely try to determine those "principles" that make these "ordinary experiences" possible.

THE FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER THREE: TRANSFORMATION: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL STANDPOINT

1. OPERAND: THE NATURAL STANDPOINT

Husserl calls his "characterization" of "the natural standpoint" a "piece of pure description prior to all theory" (E. Husserl, 1969a: 105). This characterization, in other words, is intended to be "aloof from all theories... [when] by 'theories' we here mean anticipatory ideas of every kind" (ibid.). It is only "as facts of our environment, not as agencies for writing facts validly together, do theories concern us at all" (ibid.:105-106). In other words, theories are involved in the description of the natural standpoint only as facts along with other facts in that description. That is, it is a fact that there are theories that claim to "unite facts validly together", and that in each case a theory that purports to unite facts validly together is itself a fact. So in this sense theories as facts are included.

"Our first outlook upon life is that of natural human beings, imagining, judging, feeling, willing, 'from the natural standpoint'" (ibid.:101). What this means is that we find ourselves "aware of a world, spread out in space endlessly, and in time becoming and become, without end" (ibid.). We find ourselves aware of a world in our immediate "field of perception" (ibid.), and in our "co-perceived surroundings", i.e., in our "distinct or indistinct co-present margin, which forms a continuous ring around the actual field of perception" (ibid.:102). In addition, we find ourselves aware of an "infinite", "dimly apprehended depth or fringe of indeterminate reality" (ibid.).

Furthermore, this world not only presents itself to me "now" but also along a "temporal horizon, infinite in both directions" (ibid.).

More specifically, I am aware of "corporeal things" and "animals" through sight and touch etc. Also, I am aware of other human beings; I see them, hear them, speak with them, and understand them. I experience them as "ego-subjects, units like myself" (ibid.:105). I learn that the world about me is the same as the world about "other ego-subjects" except that we each view it from different "places" (ibid.). I apprehend "an objective spatio-temporal fact world as the world about us that is there for us all, and to which we ourselves none the less belong" (ibid.).

In addition, I am aware of the world "as a world of values... [and] practicalities" (ibid.:103). "These values and practicalities... belong to the constitution of the actually present objects as such" (ibid.). In other words, I find a world of things and human beings that are "beautiful or ugly", "agreeable or disagreeable", "useful or useless" (ibid.) etc. In addition, I find human beings that are "friends or foes", "servants or superiors" (ibid.) etc. In all these cases of my awareness of a world these aspects of the world "are present as realities... irrespective of my turning or not turning to consider them... " (ibid.:101,103).

Furthermore, I am aware of myself as related to the world, i.e., as describing it as in scientific research, as comparing aspects of it, as distinguishing, counting, collecting, presupposing, theorizing, etc. (ibid.:103). Also, I am related to the world through my "diverse acts and states of sentiment and will: approval and disapproval, joy

and sorrow, desire and aversion, hope and fear, decision and action" (ibid.).

So, the "natural standpoint" is the attitude taken by each "human person" (ibid.:13) in everyday life, including the scientific life, (ibid.:106) towards "the world". It is the "attitude of natural human existence" (E. Husserl, 1970a:151). I find myself related to the "one spatio-temporal fact world", a world consisting of things, men, values, theories (as facts) etc., and find that others "as ego-subjects" share this world with me, but from different "places". I take this world as it presents itself, as something that exists. This existence in turn serves as a support for all my "existential judgments", i.e. all those "... judgments... that concern spatio-temporal existence" (ibid.:111). Furthermore, all doubting (Descartes), and rejecting of the existence of this world still leaves "it" there as the "one spatio-temporal fact world" common to us all (ibid.:106). It "endures persistently during the whole course of our life of natural endeavour" (ibid.:107).

2. OPERATOR: EPOCHĒ

The operator epochē (also referred to as: the phenomenological reduction, the transcendental reduction, and the transcendental-phenomenological reduction) refers to a "bracketing" or "disconnecting" (E. Husserl, 1969a:109) procedure. Here Husserl's background as a mathematician reveals itself since this operator can be compared with the mathematical-logical procedure of "bracketing" symbolic formulations through the use of parentheses. However, whereas whatever is bracketed in mathematics or logic is presupposed in subsequent operations, what-

ever the epochē brackets is placed "as it were out of action" (ibid: 108). Consequently, "we make no use of it" (ibid.).

The effect of the epochē is to "forbid us" (ibid.:189) from making use of whatever is bracketed. It "bars me" (ibid.:111) from presupposing the validity of whatever is enclosed in the brackets for subsequent operations. In addition, whatever presupposes what is bracketed is also "excluded" (ibid.:151).

However, while the epochē does prevent us from presupposing the validity of whatever is bracketed for subsequent operations, it does not prevent us from viewing what is bracketed in its capacity as bracketed. The meaning of these rather "formal" discussions will become clearer as the epochē is "put to work" in the next section.

3. TRANSFORM:
   (a) NEGATIVE RESULT: THE GENERAL THESIS OF THE NATURAL STANDPOINT IS BRACKETED

What is placed between the brackets of the epochē is "the general thesis which belongs to the essence of the natural standpoint" (ibid.: 110). This "general thesis" is the judgment or thesis that a spatio-temporal fact world exists. The "... epochē... completely bars me from using any judgment that concerns spatio-temporal existence (*Dasein*)" (ibid.:111). "The thesis is 'put out of action', bracketed, it passes off into the modified status of a bracketed thesis" (ibid.: 109). It prevents me from "participating... in the natural existence - positing... " (E. Husserl, 1973a:34).

Since the epochē "... is effected by me, as the actually philosophizing subject" (ibid.:13), I cannot use the bracketed thesis as a basis for my judgments. I cannot use the existence of a spatio-temporal

fact world" as a basis for my judgments. I "allow no judgment that makes any use of the affirmation that posits a 'real' thing or 'transcendent' nature as a whole, or 'co-operates' in setting up these positions. [I must] ... avoid all such affirmations" (E. Husserl, 1969a:264). In other words, the epochē forbids me from introducing "a proposition which contains, implicitly or explicitly, such reference to the natural Order" (ibid.:189).

Since "the real being of the world thereby remains unconsidered, unquestioned" (ibid.:14) "all theories and sciences [as judgments, propositions, affirmations] which relate to this world, however good they may be, succumb to the same fate" (ibid.:111). To repeat: "all the sciences natural and mental,[1] with the entire knowledge they have accumulated, undergo disconnexion as sciences which require for their development the [general thesis of] the natural standpoint" (ibid.:171). What this means is that all "empirical connexions and... systems of theorizing reason which take their bearings from these, would be excluded" (ibid.:151). So all "systems of theorizing", based upon "empirical connexions", undergo "disconnexion" because they all presuppose the "general thesis of the natural standpoint" which is the judgment that a spatio-temporal fact world (i.e., "empirical connexions") exists.

Just as all empirical sciences are left out of consideration through the operation of the epochē, so also are all "eidetic" sciences i.e., "sciences which study what belongs essentially to the physical objectivity of Nature as such" (ibid.:178). For example, eidetic sciences such as "geometry, kinematics, the 'pure' physics of matter...

rational psychology, [and] sociology, for instance... enter the brackets" (ibid.:178,179). So, just as we

> have suspended all empirical sciences dealing with the nature of animals and all mental sciences concerning personal beings in personal relationships, concerning men as subjects of history, as bearers of culture, and treating also of the cultural institutions themselves, and so forth, we also suspend now the *eidetic* sciences which correspond to these objectivities (ibid.:178).

Similarly, the eidetic science that Husserl says "is often called nowadays, phenomenological psychology" (ibid.:13) is left out of consideration, since it presupposes the existence of a spatio-temporal fact world. Through the epochē "the psychological subjectivity [that is the focus of this 'phenomenological psychology'] loses just that which makes it something real in the world that lies before us; it loses the meaning of the soul as belonging to a body that exists in an objective, spatio-temporal nature" (ibid.:14).

> Thus all sciences which relate to this natural world... though they fill me with wondering admiration, though I am far from any thought of objecting to them..., I disconnect them all, I make absolutely no use of their standards, I do not appropriate a single one of the propositions that enter into their systems... so long, that is, as it is understood, in the way these sciences themselves understand it, as a truth concerning the realities of this world (ibid.:111).

So generally, every view that presupposes the existence of a fact world is placed in suspension. In Husserl's words, "every view [or] ... opinion about 'the' world, has its ground in the pregiven world... [and] it is from this very ground that I have freed myself through the epochē..."(1970a:152).

More specifically, through the operation of the epochē I cannot

use the existence of myself as a human being as a basis for my affirmations. As Husserl says, "we apply to ourselves the rule of phenomenological reduction which bears on our own empirical existence ... " (1969a:189).

Similarly, "we apply... the rule of phenomenological reduction ... to other human beings" (ibid.). This is because the phenomenological reduction prevents us from referring "implicitly or explicitly to the natural order" including that aspect of the "natural order" that includes other human beings.

In addition, "all varieties of cultural expression, works of the technical and of the fine arts, of the sciences also (... as cultural facts...), [as well as] aesthetic and practical values" (ibid.:171) are placed between the brackets. This is because they are all either themselves statements that presuppose "the world", since they are statements about "the world", or they are themselves spatio-temporal objects about which statements can be made. In either case they succumb to the operation of the epochē.

Similarly, "realities of such kinds as... moral custom, law [and] religion" (ibid.) are placed between the brackets of the epochē. This is because they all presuppose the existence of empirical human beings in particular and a "spatio-temporal fact world" in general, to which they make reference, or about which they make pronouncements.

This completes the description of what is enclosed between the brackets of the epochē. However, in the light of the actual operation of the epochē, as shown above, a few observations need to be made in order to more adequately understand its function. In the first place,

since what is placed between the brackets is the "general thesis" which belongs to the "essence" of the natural standpoint (ibid.:110) it is clear that either the epochē presupposes the eidetic reduction or the epochē conceals the eidetic reduction as an inherent part of its operation.[2] It is remarkable that this aspect of the epochē was neither explicitly developed by Husserl nor apparently discovered and discussed by others.

In order to further clarify the operation of the epochē in relation to the "general thesis" some discussion should be directed to what it is not. It is neither a denial of the existence of the fact-world nor a doubting of its existence (reminiscent of Descartes). If I bracket the general thesis of the natural standpoint which claims the existence of a spatio-temporal fact world, "I do not then deny this 'world', as though I were a sophist. I do not doubt that it is there as though I were a sceptic... " (ibid.:110). Instead, I simply refrain "from using any judgment that concerns spatio-temporal existence" (ibid.:111). I am not permitted, through the operation of the epochē, to rely on the presupposition that a spatio-temporal fact world exists.

(b) POSITIVE RESULT: THE TRANSCENDENTAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL STANDPOINT

Having bracketed all reliance on the presupposition that a spatio-temporal fact-world exists we are forced to rely on whatever emerges as a result of this bracketing. If one takes away the existence of a fact world as the basis or general presupposition of one's thinking and its content, one is left with "consciousness" (ibid.:113) a consciousness that does not presuppose its own facticity, i.e., a

"pure" consciousness i.e., one that does not presume its spatio-temporal "natural" existence. In Husserl's words: "consciousness and what it is conscious of is therefore what is left over... once phenomenological reduction has been effected... " (1973b:15).

Here it becomes evident that the epochē is not a simple abstractive (i.e., selective) operation since in no way can one say that such a consciousness is merely an aspect of the natural standpoint. This consciousness brackets the general position that a fact world exists, while the natural standpoint is defined by the "blind" acceptance of such a presumption. In Husserl's words: "this detachment from the whole world in the form of a phenomenological reduction is something totally different from the mere abstraction of certain components... ; through such abstraction from Nature we can win only what was natural... " (E. Husserl, 1969a:156). In other words, the "phenomenological reduction does not betoken a mere restriction of the judgment to a connected portion of the totality of real being" (ibid.).

Husserl defines "consciousness in a pregnant sense... most simply indicated through the Cartesian cogito, 'I think'" (ibid.:115). As is well known "Descartes understood this in a sense so wide as to include every case of 'I perceive, I remember, I fancy, I judge, feel, desire, will', and all experiences... that in any way resemble the foregoing, in all the countless fluctuations of their special patterns" (ibid.). However, one must be careful to remember that this "cogito" or consciousness is not a psychologistic consciousness, i.e., one that conceals a reliance on the presupposition of its own spatio-

temporal existence.

While "the Being of consciousness [is] indeed... modified i.e., it is non-psychologistic [by a nullifying of the thing world,] ... [it is] not... effected thereby in its own proper existence... " (ibid.:151). Its "own proper existence" is apodictic[3] and absolute. It is apodictic in two senses. First, it is apodictic in the Cartesian sense in which its non-existence is inconceivable.

> If reflective apprehension is directed to my experience, I apprehend an absolute self whose existence (*Dasein*) is, in principle, undeniable, that is, the insight that it does not exist is, in principle, impossible; it would be nonsense to maintain the possibility of an experience *given in such a way not* truly existing. The stream of experience which is mine, that, namely, of the one who is thinking, may be ever so great an extent uncomprehended, unknown in its past and future reaches, yet as soon as I glance towards the flowing life and into the real present it flows through, and in so doing grasp myself as the pure subject of this life... ,I say forthwith and because I must: I *am*, this life is, I live: *cogito* (ibid.:143).

Secondly, it is apodictic in the sense that as a realm of "necessary Being [it is] fundamentally incapable of being given through appearance and perspective patterns" (ibid.:153). It is given directly, in an unmediated fashion, i.e., it is given apodictically. This is in contrast with "reality which manifests itself perspectively" (ibid.), i.e., in"profiles", i.e. "contingently". More specifically, subsequent profiles may be such that we were originally mistaken.

Furthermore, the existence of this consciousness is "absolute". In spite of the epochē "we have literally lost nothing, but have won the whole of Absolute Being" (ibid.:154). As pure subjectivity "I am absolutely existent in myself and for myself. Pure subjectivity alone... exists in itself and for itself" (E. Husserl, 1969b:273).

It is "absolute" in the sense that its existence is independent of the existence of a "spatio-temporal fact world". This absolute character of pure consciousness is in contrast with the relative or dependent status of the world. What this means is that the world cannot be conceived of apart from a consciousness of it (ibid.). In other words, the concept of a "thing-in-itself", apart from our consciousness, is self-contradictory. Consciousness, on the other hand, "[is] an absolute region for itself alone... it is essentially independent of all Being of the type of a world or Nature [in the sense that] it has no need of these for its existence" (ibid.:156-157). In other words, "consciousness, considered in its purity, must be reckoned as a self-contained system of Being, as a system of Absolute Being... (ibid.:153).

The epochē has shown that pure consciousness is absolute, in the sense that its existence is independent of the existence of a fact world, since the epochē leaves this world out of consideration and yet the cogito, or pure consciousness, emerges in spite of this.

Now this pure consciousness can also be viewed from an "epistemological viewpoint" since the epochē is also a "transcendental reduction" (ibid.:114). That is, the term "transcendental" has an epistemological orientation since it refers to the "motif of inquiry back into the ultimate source of all the formations of knowledge, the motif of the knower's reflecting upon himself and his knowing life" (E. Husserl, 1970a:97). In other words, the term "transcendental" has an epistemological orientation since it refers to the motif of the knower's reflecting upon his own knowing life, i.e., the life of his own pure

consciousness as the source of all the "formations", "conditions", or "principles" of the knowing process. "This source bears the title I-myself, with all my actual and possible knowing life... (ibid.:98). "It is the motif of a universal philosophy which is grounded purely in this source" (ibid.). The entire "transcendental set of problems circles around the relation of this, my 'I', the 'Ego' ... and my conscious life to the world of which I am conscious" (ibid.).

As the above quotation clearly states, in spite of the epochē "the world, exactly as it was for me earlier and still is, as my world, our world, humanities world... has not disappeared" (ibid.:152). Through the operation of the epochē the world "is under our gaze purely as the correlate of transcendental [subjectivity... ;] i.e. the world... has now become for me... a phenomenon" (ibid.). Due to the operation of the epochē "I am now no longer a human ego in... the existentially posited world, but exclusively a [transcendental] subject for which this world [as phenomena] has being" (E. Husserl, 1969a:14). What has happened is that through the method of the epochē, or transcendental-phenomenological reduction, we find the "reduction of 'the' world to the transcendental phenomenon 'world', a reduction thus also to its correlate transcendental subjectivity" (E. Husserl, 1979a:152-153).

Husserl describes somewhat metaphorically what has happened in the following passage. The

> bracketed matter is not wiped off the phenomenological slate, but only bracketed, and thereby provided with a sign that indicates the bracketing. Taking its sign with it, the bracketed matter is reintegrated in the main theme of inquiry... . To take a pertinent illustration:

> physical nature suffers disconnexion, whilst notwithstanding we continue to have not only a phenomenology of the natural scientific consciousness on the side of its thought and experience, but also a phenomenology of nature itself as correlate of the natural scientific consciousness. Similarly, although psychology and mental science are effected by the disconnexion, we have a phenomenology of man, his personality, personal qualities, and his conscious course (as a human being); a phenomenology, further, of the mind of the community, its social institutions, its cultural creations, and so forth (E. Husserl, 1969a:212-213).

So, we see that transcendental consciousness is a consciousness of the same world. In fact, "if phenomenology were to replace the natural attitude, to declare it invalid, it would, by that same step, become empty, for it would have nothing to descibe" (D. Carr, 1974:38). To repeat: the epochē in respect to all natural human life-interests appears to be a turning-away from them (which is, by the way, one of the most common misunderstandings of the transcendental epochē). But if it were meant in this way, there would be no transcendental inquiry (E. Husserl, 1970a:176). However, due to the operation of the epochē we no longer simply take this world for granted, we do not accept it as a presupposed "resource" for our inquiries. Instead, its existence becomes a "topic" (not a resource) for inquiry since "the bracketed matter is reintegrated in the main theme of the inquiry" (ibid.:212).

So, in retrospect, it can be seen that through the operation of the epochē a "*transformation of... attitude*" (ibid.:151) has resulted - a transformation from the natural standpoint or attitude to the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint or attitude. In addition, it becomes apparent that this "transformation" is impossible without the operation of the epochē. More specifically, "the attitude of natural human existence... precedes [the attitude of transcendental

phenomenology] not accidently but essentially" (ibid.). So the epochē... is... the gate of entry through which one must pass in order to be able to discover the new world of pure subjectivity" (ibid.:256). It turns out "to be the necessary operation which renders pure consciousness accessible to us, and subsequently the whole phenomenological region" (E. Husserl, 1969a:114). In other words, "this disconnexion from nature was for us the methodological means whereby the direction of the mental glance upon the pure transcendental consciousness became at all possible" (ibid.:171).

In summary, this chapter has shown how the epochē, or transcendental-phenomenological reduction, has accomplished "a reduction of 'the' world [of the natural standpoint] to the transcendental phenomenon 'world', a reduction thus also to its correlate, transcendental subjectivity" (E. Husserl, 1970a:152-3).

FOOTNOTES

1. "Under sciences... developed from the natural standpoint, are included not only all so-called natural sciences, in the more extended as well as in the narrower sense of the term, the sciences of material nature, but also the sciences of animal beings... , with their psychophysical nature, physiology, and so forth. All so-called mental sciences also come under this head - history, the cultural sciences, the solciological disciplines of every kind, whereby we provisionally leave it an open question whether they are to be held similar to the natural sciences or placed in opposition to them, be themselves accepted as natural sciences or as sciences of an essentially new type" (E. Husserl, 1969a:52).

2. A by-product of the researches contained in this thesis is the discovery that all three of the operators discussed, either explicitly (in the case of the Chapter Four operator) or implicitly "contain" or presuppose the eidetic reduction. They all show themselves to be eidetically oriented in their operation. That is, all are concerned with the reduction of essences.

3. This is in contrast with the contingency of the world's existence. In this realm "no proofs drawn from the empirical consideration of the world can be conceived which could assure us with certainty of the world's existence. The world is not doubtful in the sense that there are rational grounds which might be pitted against the tremendous force of unanimous experiences, but in the sense that a doubt is *thinkable*, and this is so because the possibility of non-being is in principle never excluded" (E. Husserl, 1969a:145).

CHAPTER FOUR: TRANSFORMATION: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EIDETIC STRUCTURE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL STANDPOINT

1. OPERAND: THE TRANSCENDENTAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL STANDPOINT

As is readily apparent, the operand of this transformation is merely the positive transform of the previous transformation. This, of course, is consistent with the discussion presented in the introduction to this thesis wherein it was explained that the framework of this thesis would be formally structured by means of three related transformations.

Since the positive transform of the first transformation is the operand of the second transformation it remains merely to summarize the transform of the previous chapter. Through the operation of the epochē two transforms resulted, a negative one and a positive one.

More specfically, through the operation of the epochē the "general thesis of the natural standpoint" was bracketed. This meant that one could no longer presuppose the existence of a spatio-temporal fact world as a foundation for one's judgments.

At the same time a positive transform emerged: the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint. By not being permitted to presuppose the existence of a fact world, a new standpoint revealed itself. By taking away the existence of a fact world as the ground for one's thinking, one is left only with one's thinking and its content. One is left with consciousness, a "pure" consciousness, one that does not presuppose its own existence, as a spatio-temporal existence (due to the operation of the epochē).

Also, through the operation of the epochē it becomes apparent

that this consciousness is a "transcendental" consciousness since by focusing on consciousness one focuses upon the knower's knowing life, which is precisely the transcendental turn. A moments reflection further shows that this transcendental consciousness always has a content, it is always a consciousness of something. Furthermore, since the epochē has not restricted what this transcendental subjectivity can be conscious of it can be conscious of anything whatsoever. The epochē simply prevents me from presuming the spatio-temporal existence of what one is conscious of.

2. OPERATOR: EIDETIC REDUCTION

Having "transformed" the natural standpoint into the new transcendental-phenomenological standpoint through the epochē it is necessary to know what universal properties define this new standpoint. In other words, what "we lack... is a certain general insight into the essence of consciousness in general" (E. Husserl, 1969a:113), i.e., transcendental consciousness. In order to determine what this essence is, it is necessary to apply the eidetic reduction to this new standpoint.

It is the aim of this section to show what the eidetic reduction is by showing how it works. This will set the stage for its application to the "new standpoint". Since the eidetic reduction was already introduced in the "Introduction to the Idea of a Foundation", my aim here will be to expand and build upon this discussion.

The eidetic reduction appears to operate in at least two distinguishable stages. These stages are: one, the selection or abstraction of an example or illustration, and two, the "free-variation" in the

imagination of the example.

According to Husserl, it "belongs to the general and essential nature of immediate, intuitive essence - apprehension... that it can be carried out on the basis of the mere present framing of particular illustrations" (ibid.:198). Any example taken from a given class of objects[1] can serve as the "raw material" for the operation of the eidetic reduction. In Husserl's words, "any variant of the example could have served equally well" (E. Husserl, 1969b:248).

Secondly, the example is "varied freely in the imagination or fantasy". According to Husserl, "in phenomenology... free fancies [i.e., free-variations in fantasy] assume a privileged position" (E. Husserl, 1969a:199). In fact, he states without hesitation that "the element which makes up the life of phenomenology as of all eidetical science is fiction" (ibid.:20) i.e., free fantasy.

It is a "free" variation in the imagination in the sense that it is not bound to factualness. In the case of sound, for example, the simple listening to a signle illustrative sound or to a variety of illustrative sounds or to their actual variation say by means of stereophonic equipment, will not reveal eidetic limits. Only factual limits will be discovered such as the fact that my ear cannot tolerate a sound louder than so many decibels. After one has heard and factually varied any number of sounds it is still up to the imagination or "free fancy" to try to "conceive" of a sound without pitch, for example. Only in this decisive final step does it become possible to understand that pitch is essentially necessary to the conceivability of sound. This could not have been discovered through the mere listening to a

variety of sounds or to the varying of a particular sound say by varying its pitch. It is only when one tries to "imagine" the sound without pitch that an essential necessity reveals itself. In general terms, whatever "in purely invariant and reduced form is peculiar to the experience and cannot be thought away from it, as it is itself... passes *eo ipso* into the eidos... " (ibid.:261). Since the pitch of a sound "cannot be thought away from it", without destroying sound itself, pitch "passes *eo ipso* into the eidos". So a free-variation that reveals essences is possibly only in and through the imagination.

So, it is through the operation of the eidetic reduction, with its selection of an illustration or example, and its free-variation of this example in the imagination, that essential necessities are discovered. In general terms, these essential necessities are the "invariant [properties] the indissolubly identical in the different and ever again different" (E. Husserl, 1969b:248). Pitch, for example, is an "invariant" property of any sound whatsoever; it is "identical" in every different sound in the sense of being present in every sound - although of course this pitch assumes different values in actuality.

Alternatively expressed, an essential necessity is a "principle... or norm" (E. Husserl, 1964a:46) or "frame" (E. Husserl, 1969a:413) that determines the boundaries of an experience of a certain sort, like the experience of a sound or colour, for example. The experience of sound, for example, is governed by the "principle, or rule, or frame" that any experience of sound without pitch is inconceivable. This is a "boundary" or "limit" for the experience of sound. Similarly,

the experience of colour is governed by the principle or rule that any experience of a colour that is not extended is inconceivable (ibid.:156). This rule specifies a "boundary" for the experience of colour such that if that "boundary" is "overstepped" or "violated" an "intrinsic absurdity" (ibid.:231) results. So, the essence of something is its necessary structure (ibid.:60); it is what is necessary to its possibility or conceivability. As Husserl puts it: "... the question of the possibility of experience... is... at the same time... the question of the essence of experience" (E. Husserl, 1964a:27). An "essence proves to be that without which an object of a particular kind cannot be thought" (E. Husserl, 1973b:341).

Elsewhere, Husserl also identifies essential necessities with the ā priori. In Husserl's words, the "concept eidos... defines the only concept belonging to the multisignificant expression, ā priori, that I recognize philosophically. That concept alone is meant whenever the locution ā priori occurs in my writings" (E. Husserl, 1969b:248). And again, this "invariant is the ontic essential form (ā priori form), the eidos" (ibid.).

Also, because of the prior operation of the epochē, which, of course, is still in effect, "the positing of the essence... does not imply any positing of individual existence whatsoever; pure essential truths do not make the slightest assertion concerning fact" (E. Husserl, 1969a:57). Essential necessities just state what properties are necessary to make the existence of something a possibility, they do not state that this something exists in some factual sense. It does not deny this existence, it just does not have anything to say on the

subject.

Since the eidetic reduction selects the invariant properties of whatever it examines it rejects the "individual elements" (ibid.: 209), i.e., it rejects the unique elements of an object. In the language of phenomenology, this attitude which consists in considering the world of objects, but in so doing ignores the individual existence in order to dwell exclusively upon the essence, is called eidetic reduction. In other words, the focus on eidetic properties ensures that the "accidental" (ibid.:272) or unique i.e., the inessential, is ignored. So the eidetic reduction is not interested in all the properties that define a particular thing, it is interested only in those that are essential necessities.

Consequently, when the eidetic reduction is turned to the reduction of this new standpoint, as it is in this chapter, only essential necessities will be presented. In other words, the transform to follow will present only those properties that make this new standpoint of transcendental consciousness possible, i.e., conceivable. However, the possibility that these properties will subsequently be refined or supplemented is left as an open possibility.

3. TRANSFORM: THE EIDETIC STRUCTURE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL STANDPOINT IS PRIMARILY A CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE WITHIN WHICH CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES OPERATE

Through the operation of the eidetic reduction upon any particular act of transcendental consciousness - as for example my belief that this page exists - it is immediately apparent that I am able to "reflect" upon this belief, otherwise I would not at this moment be able to think, through my writing, about such a belief. Without the possibility of

such a reflective turn I would simply believe that this paper exists without being able to think about this belief.

In more general terms, even to posit such a consciousness, as we have done in the transform of the previous chapter, is to imply its reflexive nature since to posit such a consciousness is already to reflect upon it. Husserl puts it in the following way:

> He who merely says, I doubt the significance of reflexion [sic] for knowledge, maintaines an absurdity. For as he asserts his doubt, he reflects and to set this assertion forth as valid presupposes that reflexion has really and without a doubt (for the case in hand) the very cognitive value upon which doubt has been cast... (ibid.:227-228).

Husserl even goes so far as to say that "even He [i.e., God] could win a knowledge of His consciousness and its content only through reflexion" (ibid.:229).

Consciousness, in its "straight forward" attitude towards that which it is conscious of, is unreflective or unexamined. However, to the essence of this consciousness belongs "the possibility of self-examination" (E. Husserl, 1969b:273). In Husserl's words: "living in the cogito we have not got the cogitatio [i.e., consciousness] consciously before us as an... object; but it can at any time become this: to its essence belongs in principle the possibility of a 'reflexive' directing of the mental glance towards itself naturally in the form of a new cogitatio..."(E. Husserl, 1969a:123).

Nothing at all can be said about this new standpoint of transcendental consciousness, from within this standpoint, unless it can "direct its mental glance towards itself". The "study of the stream of consciousness takes place... through various acts of reflection of

peculiar structure... " (ibid.:218). So nothing can be known about this "stream" except from a reflexive standpoint. Reflection consequently reveals itself as necessary to the possibility of a transcendental phenomenology itself since such a phenomenology really is nothing more than the study of transcendental consciousness and its relation to the world of phenomena.

Husserl approaches a definition of "reflection" when he refers to it as "a new cogitatio" (ibid.:123) that directs its attention towards the cogito that is the direct result of the operation of the epochē. He further refers to it as "an expression for acts in which the stream of experience (*Erlebnis*) with all of its manifold events (phases of experience...) can be grasped and analyzed..."(ibid.:219). It is "the name we give to consciousness' own method for the knowledge of consciousness generally" (ibid.).[2] For example, to my "conscious life", to my "sensuously perceiving and imagining life", or to my "asserting, valuing or willing life" I can at any time direct my "reflective regard"; I "can contemplate it and, in respect of its contents", I "can explicate it and describe it" (E. Husserl, 1973a:31). To further illustrate the reflexive nature of consciousness Husserl gives the example of "a piece of music". "At first we are unreflectively aware in memory of the flow of a piece of music, it may be, in the mode of what is 'past'. But to the essence of what we are thus aware of belongs the possibility of reflecting on what has been perceived" (E. Husserl, 1969a:220).

So "reflexivity" turns out to be an eidetic property of this new standpoint, without which it would be inconceivable.

Through the operation of the reflective eidetic reduction upon illustrations of consciousness' various modalities, such as recollection or belief, it becomes apparent that each of these cases are recollections or beliefs etc. carried out by an "ego". "Only through acts of experiencing as reflected on do we know anything of the stream of experience and of its necessary relationship to the pure Ego" (ibid.:222). Since each of these cases "of acts of experiencing" merely illustrates the activity of consciousness in general, consciousness itself is always the consciousness carried out by an ego (ibid.:121). Also, since the epochē is, of course, in operation, it is a transcendental ego. In Husserl's words:

> Among the essential peculiarities of a general kind, distinctive of the transcendentally purified field of experience, the first place should be kept for the relating of that experience to the "pure" Ego. Every "*cogito*" [act of consciousness] every act in a specially marked sense, is characterized as an act of the Ego, "proceeding from the Ego".., . I the man as Ego... the "being directed towards", "the being busied with", "adopting an attitude", "undergoing or suffering from" has this of necessity wrapped in its essence, that it is just something "from the Ego" or in reverse direction... (ibid.:232-233).

This essential necessity means that these acts of consciousness are "the conscious processes of one and the *same* Ego... " (ibid.:222). In other words it "remains absolutely self-identical in all real and possible changes of experience... " (ibid.:172). In fact, this self-identity (or sameness) of the transcendental ego is necessary to such "real and possible changes of experience" - as an invariant component against which such variation or "changes of experience" is possible. This is because variation in general is only conceivable against a background of invariance. This then is an argument for the necessity

of the relationship between the self-identical transcendental ego and its act of consciousness.

In addition, two distinct modalities of consciousness such as perception and retention, for example, can only be maintained in a sequence, as a unity (say, where retention follows perception) if they are unified by a self-identical ego that holds them together by referring them both to the same ego. Consequently, the transcendental ego acts as a necessary unifying principle for consciousness, and in fact is precisely what permits us to speak of a single consciousness.

Also, this essentially necessary connection between the transcendental ego and its acts of consciousness means that the ego exists necessarily since consciousness exists necessarily (i.e., its non-existence is indubitable, i.e., to deny its existence is self-contradictory). In other words, if consciousness exists necessarily, and if the ego is connected with consciousness necessarily then the ego exists necessarily also. In Husserl's words "the Ego appears to be permanently, even necessarily, there... " (ibid.:172). In fact, "the transcendental ego exists (*ist*) absolutely in and for itself prior to all cosmic being" (ibid.:14), "... the reduced Ego is not a piece of the world"... (E. Husserl, 1973a:26), it is not a "*tag-end of the world*" (ibid.:24). Its existence is "absolutely" independent of the world in the sense that while the non-existence of the world is possible the non-existence of the ego and its conscious life is impossible. To assert the non-existence of the ego and its conscious life is self-contradictory and therefore absurd. So the existence of the transcendental ego and its conscious life is absolute, i.e. not relative to,

or dependent upon the existence of a world to which it makes reference.

While Husserl claims that the transcendental ego is absolute in its existence and that it is "self-identical" it, nevertheless, in terms of any possible content that it itself may have, "is completely emply of essential components" (E. Husserl, 1969a:233). What this means is that the transcendental ego itself cannot be made into "an object of inquiry" i.e., "apart from its way of behaving" (ibid.: 233), i.e., apart from the acts of consciousness to which it is necessarily connected. In other words, "it has no content that could be unravelled, it is in and for itself indescribable: pure Ego and nothing further" (ibid.:233). Since its existence is directly accessible to us becuase of its "immanence" and yet remains "indescribable" Husserl calls it a "transcendence in immanence" (ibid.:173).

Through the operation of the reflective eidetic reduction upon any particular transcendental act of consciousness, say a particular act of doubt, for example, it becomes apparent that this particular act of consciousness (which is merely an illustrative example of consciousness in general) has what Husserl calls an "intentional structure". Since the particular act is merely an illustrative example of consciousness in general, where any other example would have been equally acceptable (E. Husserl, 1969b:248), this "intentional structure" can be said to be characteristic of both the example and consciousness in general. Also, since it is characteristic of consciousness in general it is necessarily characteristic of any other illustrative act of consciousness. So, this "intentional structure" is an "essentially necessary" property of transcendental consciousness.

It is essential to the possibility of transcendental consciousness.

This property of transcendental consciousness called "intentionality" simply means that consciousness in general and any particular act of consciousness is always a "consciousness *of* something" (E. Husserl, 1973a:50; 1969a:242). This deceptively simple property is really at the "crux"[3] of transcendental phenomenology and permits Husserl to avoid a Hegelian type of subjective idealisms that reduces reality to consciousness. Instead, Husserl, through the property of intentionality, will keep consciousness and reality absolutely separate and distinct from one another. As Husserl states it "Between the meanings of consciousness and reality yawns a veritable abyss" (E. Husserl, 1969a:153).

As mentioned above, every particular act of consciousness has an intentional structure. More specifically, belief is a belief in something, doubt is a doubt with regard to something, "perceiving is the perceiving of something, maybe a thing; judging, the judging of a certain matter; valuation, the valuing of something; wish, the wish for the content wished, and so on" (ibid.:243).

Husserl encorporates a Cartesian manner of speaking in his eidetic description of the intentional structure of transcendental consciousness, particularly in his *Cartesian Meditations*. The intentional structure of consciousness is described in the following terms: "ego - cogitatio - cogitata" (E. Husserl, 1973a:50). In other words, the term intentionality "signifies nothing else than this universal fundamental property of consciousness: to be conscious *of* something; as a cogito to bear within itself cogitatum" (E. Husserl, 1973a:50;

1969a:242). However, this "containment" metaphor (i.e., "within itself") should not be taken in the sense of some kind of logical inclusion, since, as mentioned earlier "Between consciousness [i.e., the cogito] and reality [i.e., the cogitatum] there yawns a true abyss of sense". Instead, this metaphor should be understood in the sense of an invariant relation such that every cogito is invariably linked to its cogitatum.

The Cartesian Cogito and Husserl's use of it, includes every case of "I perceive, I remember, I fancy, I judge, feel, desire, will, and all experiences of the Ego that in any way resemble the foregoing ... " (E. Husserl, 1969a:115). However, Husserl's epochē prevents *his* cogito from assuming a "substantialized" character, in the Cartesian manner, and thereby also prevents it from assuming a causal relation to the world. The presupposition here, of course, is that causality is possible only in a "substantial" realm of being. So, the result is that the cogito does not have a causal relation towards its cogitatum, but instead the cogito is intentionally related to its cogitatum.

The intentionality of consciousness is also expressed as a "bi-polarity" in which a "noetic pole" makes reference to a "noematic pole". Husserl refers to this bi-polarity of consciousness with its "noetico-noematic structures" (ibid.:280) as an essential law. This lawfulness means that there is no "noetic phase without a noematic phase that belongs specifically to it" (ibid.).

In addition to the "noetico-noematic" correlativity, Husserl adds a third component to the structure of intentionality. For this

component he introduces "the expression hyletic or material data, also plainly and simply materials (*Stuffe*)" (ibid.:248). These are "sensory contents such as the data of colour, touch, sound... pleasure, pain, tickling, etc... " (ibid.:246-247). Like noeses, hyletic data belong to the level of pure consciousness. So consciousness (or the purified cogito), in this terminology, has two "real" components: the hyletic as well as the noetic (ibid.:248-285). However, unlike the noetic component "the sensile element... contains in itself nothing intentional... " (ibid.:247,120).[4] In addition, the hyletic or "sensile element" assumes an indubitable "reality". For example, to simultaneously experience "pleasure" (a hyletic datum) and deny its existence is absurd.

Having briefly introduced the non-Cartesian way of expressing intentionality, i.e., in its "ego-noetic-hyletic-noematic" form, it is necessary at this point to devote some discussion to the meaning of the noetic pole in order to set the stage for the subsequent discussion of its function in the "intentional process".

The essential thing about these "noetic phases" or noeses is that they are "meaningful". In other words, so far as the noetic pole is concerned "it is its essential nature to harbor in itself a meaning of some sort" (ibid.:257). And again, "it is [the noetic pole's] essential nature to conceal 'meaning' within itself" (ibid.:251). Husserl, however, nowhere (to my knowledge) defines explicitly and in general terms the meaning of these "meanings". Neither does Husserl say where these meanings come from. As R. Sokolowski puts it: "Meanings are simply there, but their origins are not explained. They

are posited as ready-made in the intention" (1970:59). However, an understanding of this term can be acquired by looking into the use that will be made of it below.

According to Husserl, "material elements [i.e., hyletic or sensile phases] are 'animated' through noetic phases, they undergo... 'formal shapings', 'gifts of meaning'... " (E. Husserl, 1969a:284). In other words, "over those sensile phases lies as it were an 'animating', meaning - bestowing stratum [the noeses]... " (ibid.: 247).

The result of the operation of this noetic "meaning - bestowing stratum" upon the hyletic stratum is a "noematic" stratum. In other words, this noetic-hyletic operation yields "the meant purely as meant" (E. Husserl, 1973a:56). The epochē prevents me from claiming that this noematic stratum is other than "mere intentional being" (E. Husserl, 1969a:153). In other words, through the operation of the "epochē we effect a reduction to our pure meaning [noetic meaning]... and to the meant, purely as meant" [noematic meaning] (E. Husserl, 1973a: 56). So when pure consciousness is described as essentially intentional in structure, i.e., that it is always a consciousness *of* "something", this "something" is not the kind of "something" for which reality claims are made. Instead, the epochē prevents me from making such claims. Being, consequently is not viewed as "real being" but as "mere intentional being" (E. Husserl, 1969a:153), being merely as intended or referred to through noetic acts. Since this intending is a "meaning giving" or "animating" process, the "something" or "being" referred to is necessarily only a "meant something" - "mere intentional being". After the

epochē, reality "has the essence of something that in principle is only intentional, only something we are conscious of, something presented, something appearing" (ibid.:154). Reality after the epochē depends, exclusively, for its sense upon noetic consciousness.

A series of brief examples should help to crystalize what Husserl means by intentionality and its intentional animation function. For example, the "thought" (noetic meaning) gives the character of the "thought about" (noematic meaning) to a particular set of hyletic data. Similarly, the "valuation" (noetic meaning) gives the character of the "valued" (noematic meaning) to a particular set of hyletic data (colour for example). Again, the belief (noetic meaning) gives the character of the "believed in" (noematic meaning) to a particular set of hyletic data. For example, an "existence belief" (noetic meaning) gives the character of "existence" (noematic meaning) to a particular set of hyletic data. So when "reality claims" are made they are introduced only as noetic and noematic meanings, so that "existence" becomes only a part of the "meaning" of the "object meant".

In summary, the eidetic structure of this new standpoint is defined by a reflexive transcendental ego that relates itself to a meant world in and through the structure of intentionality.

It is within this eidetic structure that a process called "constitution"[5] operates. In general terms, the theory of constitution is a theory of "objectivation" (ibid.:332). It is a theory that claims to provide a general structure within which an objectivity or objective region can be given a subjective grounding or explanation. Since "intentionality" describes the subjective relation to objectivity

this constitutional process is described in its noetic-noematic correlativity.

The aim of the theory of constitution is to explain the noematic meanings of an entity by showing how these meanings "originate" in noetic acts of consciousness through the intermediate hyletic stratum. The problem is to "go back to the intentional origins... of the formation of meaning..., [that is, to] move from a ready made entity back to its intentional origins... " (E: Husserl, 1970a:168). Husserl, apparently, simply accepts as "axiomatic" that "reality recives its sense from subjectivity" (R. Sokolowski, 1970:133). This is because this sense-giving function of subjectivity is intentionality and intentionality is a fundamental eidetic property of consciousness. Furthermore, as Husserl often states, "eidetic descriptions have nothing to fear from the finest arguments". It apparently has little to gain from the "finest arguments" either since few are presented. This is understandable though, because the claim of Husserl's phenomenology is that it simply provides "eidetic descriptions" of phenomena exactly as they present themselves to consciousness. In a discipline that simply describes what it "sees", no arguments are necessary.

In order to make sense of what Husserl means by the term "objectivity" two theoretically separate components of the objective "noematic nucleus" must be distinguished. The first component to be distinguished is the "X" that is the "central point of unification" (E. Husserl, 1969a: 365). This "central point of unification" is also referred to as "the noematic object simpliciter" (ibid.:366). It is the "pure X in

abstraction from all... predicate - noemata" (ibid.). As such, it is the "nodal point" (ibid.:365), or "empty X" (ibid.:367) to which the noemata attach themselves. This "X" is the "bearer of meaning", it is the "bearer of noematic predicates" (ibid.). According to Husserl, no meaning is possible apart from this empty X (ibid.).

In Husserl's words:

> the predicates are predicates of "something" and this "something" belongs together with the predicates, to the nucleus in question: it is the central point of unification... . It is the nodal point of connexion for the predicates, their "bearer", but in no wise their unity in the sense in which any system or connexion of predicates might be called a unity. It [X] must be distinguished from these [predicates], although it [X] should not be set alongside them and should not be separate from them, as inversely they themselves are its predicates: inconceivable without it [X] and yet distinguishable from it. (ibid.:365).

So the total objective nucleus consists of the empty X to which all its noematic predicates attach themselves. Consequently, the second component of the "total objective nucleus" is this cluster of noematic prediates.

R. Sokolowski provides an example that serves to illustrate the function of the "object simpliciter, X" as a bearer of noematic predicates:

> For instance, in pure phantasy I can think about an entity which looks like a stone, then changes into a living creature, then becomes invisible and dimensionless. There is one subject [one "X"] for all these characteristics, and the manifold of senses [noemata] (extended, brown, inanimate; then animated, breathing; then suddenly not visible but capable of being heard, capable of causing things to happen, etc.) are all predicates of this one subject [the "X"] (1970:151-152).

This extreme example was chosen precisely to illustrate that even in the case of an entity whose reality is inconceivable, there still

remains the underlying empty X. This is so because one simply could not conceive of the possibility of presenting the *continuous* variation of noemata (as we have done in the example) except with reference to an underlying empty X that maintains that continuity as the continuity of some entity.

The theory of constitution addresses the problem of the subjective constitution of this noematic nucleus. However, the noematic predicates, in their total actual and possible multiplicity, in themselves, are of no direct interest to an exclusively eidetic discipline. Instead, the noematic nucleus must be examined for the eidetic characters that make the particular noematic nucleus a possibility. The theory of constitution is interested only in the eidetic character of the total noematic nucleus. In Husserl's words: "... it is here throughout a question of eidetic... connexions [sic]... , [it is a question of] "the essential relations between the noetic and the noematic... " (E. Husserl, 1969a;286).

These "eidetic characters" are understood as the "channels" (ibid.:414) or "limits" within which "infinite noematic variations" are possible. This "infinite noematic variation" can be understood with the aid of an illustration. Consider the infinite variations possible in the noema "tree"[6] for instance. The total noematic nucleus of the noema tree, includes characteristics such as its colour, for example, particular shades of green and brown, its distance from me when I stand in this particular place. It also includes the multiplicity of noematic variations possible in the imagination. These noematic variations would include a variation in colour, in the

imagination, a variation of shape, in the imagination, say from the perceptual "primordial" tree shape, that I see before me, to a perfectly square shape. So, the tree, in its actuality as well as its potentiality, is the total noematic nucleus.[7] It is clear that the "infinity" here points to the possibility of presenting the various noematic shades and shapes etc. in an endless variation in perception and imagination. So, as the perception flows forward or is interrupted in an "eye-blink" or is simply "recalled" or "imagined", in its relation to the "same" object (the "same" tree, for example) the "noematic content" continually changes. In other words, "it belongs (a priori) to the proper essence of the perception to have 'its' object, and to have it as the unity of a certain noematic content (*Bestandes*), which for other perceptions of 'the same object' is always something different again, though always essentially described in advance... " (ibid.:286).

This infinity of actual and possible noematic variations present themselves in and through the "invariant channels" already mentioned above. These invariant channels define the "essence" of the noematic nucleus. They define the "Eidos of the noema" (ibid.:287). For example, the total noematic "material thing", tree, presents itself in perception and imagination in an infinite variation of actual and possible shapes. But throughout all such variation the essence or invariant property "shape" or "extension" remains. That is, this particular material thing cannot be varied in imagination or perception in such a manner as to avoid the fact that it must have shape (be extended), without violating the nature of a material thing,

i.e., without violating the "rule" that prescribes the essence of material things. In Husserl's words, we are "bound by a law-conforming space as a frame which the idea of a possible thing in general strictly prescribes for us. However arbitrarily we may vary the form of what we may fancy, one spatial shape will inevitably pass over into another" (ibid.:413). In other words, the "region [material] 'thing' prescribes rules for the course of possible intentions... " (ibid.).

In general terms, as an "idea [Eidos]... the complete givenness [of the noematic nucleus]... as a connexion [sic] of endless processes of continuous appearance... is prescribed... , is absolutely fixed in its essential type... " (ibid.:397). The noematic nucleus, as "a continuum of appearances [is] determined a priori... , [it is] governed by an established dispensation of essential order" (ibid.).

This endless continuum of noematic appearances, with its eidetic prescriptions, presupposes its underlying "determinable" or "empty X". Through these infinite noematic variations, prescribed a priori by eidetic rules, the empty X is "more closely determined". To repeat: the infinite noematic variation of all the "phases of appearances of the same determinable X, [is] so ordered as a connected system and so determined as to its essential content that any of its lines when carried continuously forward gives a harmonious system of appearances... , wherein the given X, ever one and the same, is with unbroken consistency more closely and never 'otherwise' determined" (ibid.:397).

It is through the theory of constitution that the eidetic structure

of the noematic nucleus is to be accounted for in terms of transcendental subjectivity. In other words, the essential noematic unity is to be explained by describing the noetic acts that "correspond" with or "parallel" the manifold of eidetic noematic properties. That is, a "parallelism between noesis and noema does indeed exist" (ibid.:288), because of the universal property of "intentionality", and these noetic and noematic "formations must be described on both sides in their essential correspondence" (ibid.). The theory of constitution claims that "all acts whatsoever... are objectivating acts,.., originally constituting objects. They are necessary sources of various regions of being and, consequently, of the ontologies that belong to them" (ibid.:333).

In this process of constitution, hyletic data (i.e., purely sensory data) play largely a passive and often "behind the scenes" role. However, Husserl does admit that the way in which these hyletic data can be "interpreted" or "animated" (objectivated) is to some extent limited by the nature of the hyle. The purely hyletic datum of "joy", for example, cannot be noetically interpreted and constituted noematically as a "sorrowful" object. The hyle does restrict the range of interpretation. However, the hyletic level is, for Husserl, a relatively unimportant component of the constitutional process (ibid.:251), and he as a consequence does not devote a great deal of attention to it. He is more interested in the noetic and noematic components which he considers more important. Why Husserl de-emphasizes the hyletic component is not clear.

So the problem of the theory of constitution, in general terms,

is to explain noetically, through the medium of hyletic data, the possibility of essential noematic unities.[8] The problem is to discover those noetic essential conditions that make possible the emergence of the particular kind of noematic essential[9] sense of transcendence that a particular kind of object or region has. The problem is to find those noetic essential relations that make a particular object or region a possibility.

More precisely, the problem is, first, to describe, say, a "material thing", in its essential noematic unity. Then the problem is to specify the noetic acts, in association with the appropriate hyletic data, that make possible that noematic essential unity.

Illustrations of how specific constitutional processes operate are reserved for the next chapter which is devoted to "the establishment of the eidetic structure of any specific constitutional process". This is because any specific illustrations of constitutional processes describe "the eidetic structure of any specific constitutional process" and therefore rightfully belong in the next chapter.

FOOTNOTES

1. To the best of my knowledge Husserl nowhere discusses the basis upon which a particular illustration is chosen. Perhaps a category such as Rickert's or Weber's "value relevance" would permit one to overcome the infinity of examples, i.e. would provide a basis for one's selection. This in turn would make the eidetic results consistent with a particular chosen value standpoint thereby guaranteeing the value-relevance of the results.

2. Since the eidetic reduction was the "method" used to acquire eidetic knowledge about consciousness, it is reflexive in nature. Husserl, in fact claims that the "phenomenological method proceeds entirely through acts of reflection" (E. Husserl, 1969a:215). This implies that the operator of the transformation to follow, i.e. "constitutional analysis", is also reflexive. This shows itself to be true since it too operates upon transcendental consciousness. However, it is more difficult to see how this is the case with the epochē since it is only after its operation that transcendental consciousness reveals itself, thus making its transcendental reflexive nature during its operation problematic since at the point of its operation there is no transcendental consciousness to be reflexive towards. This seems to make the epochē unreflexive - at least in the transcendental sense. However, it can be viewed as reflexive towards "natural" consciousness, thus making Husserl's statement understandable. But, this would "naturalize" the epochē, something transcendental phenomenology would find unacceptable. The conclusion seems to be that the epochē is transcendentally unreflexive. However, this seems to be completely unacceptable for the operation that is the "gateway" to transcendental phenomenology itself.

3. The importance of the concept of intentionality is supported by the claim of R. A. Mall when he says "that the central - most teaching of Husserl's phenomenology is the discovery of the 'noetic-noematic' correlativity" (1973:VII) which is intentionality. In Husserl's words, "the title of the problem which in its scope covers phenomenology in its entirety is intentionality. This indeed expresses the fundamental problem of consciousness; all phenomenological problems... find their ordered place within it" (1969a:404).

4. Here a problem seems to arise for Husserl, while Husserl clearly indicates that consciousness is always "intentional" he at the same time says that the hyletic component of consciousness is not

intentional. Consequently, either the hyletic component must be placed outside of consciousness or we have a contradiction, since consciousness cannot be both intentional and non-intentional. The unavoidable solution at this point is perhaps to place the hyletic component outside of consciousness in order to remove the contradiction.

5. In the context of Husserl's theory of constitution, I am much indebted to the clear, scholarly presentation found in Doctor Sokolowski's book entitled *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution*.

6. To treat a tree as a total nowmatic unity, as Husserl does, presupposes that literally "the objective world, the world that exists for me, the only world that ever can exist for me - this world, with all its objects... derives its whole sense and its existential status, which it has for me, from me myself, from me as the transcendental ego... " (E. Husserl, 1973a:26). In other words, to treat a tree, or anything else, "in the world", as a total noematic unity, that is, to treat it as an object characterized exclusively by "noematic" predicates, is consistent with Husserl's claim that "anything worldly necessarily acquires all the sense determining it... exclusively from my experiencing, my objectivating, thinking, valuing... " etc., (ibid.). This is a bit difficult to accept, however, since it is hard to see how such properties as the particular shade of green is to be explained totally and exclusively by transcendental subjectivity. Instead, I am inclined to agree with R. Sokolowski (1970:138,149,166), when he claims that a certain "facticity" remains in Husserl's phenomenology. The object cannot be explained in its total noematic sense by subjective (i.e. noematic) acts. There always remains a certain facticity in the phenomena that present themselves as "total noematic unities". What this means is that this total object, this tree, cannot be referred to as a total "noematic" unity, as Husserl refers to it, since not all of the so-called noemata are likely to be explainable noetically.

It seems, we are expected to accept on faith that the total sense of the world has its source in transcendental subjectivity. This seems to be built into Husserl's phenomenology since he claims, in spite of the fact that the theory of constitution explains the origin of only the essential noematic components, that nevertheless the whole sense, is explained noetically - even though no attempt is made to explain noetically the inessential noemata.

7. The description of the noema, a particular tree, is based on Husserl's description presented in his *Ideas* (1969a:282-286).

8. Consequently, the theory of constitution ignores the constitution of the "total noematic nucleus". It focuses only upon the empty "X" with its essential noematic predicates. This further supports the claim that a certain element of "facticity" remains in transcendental phenomenology. Only the essential noemata of "X" are to be explained noetically. The total noematic nucleus, in its totality, is simply a facticity that presents itself. Only that aspect of the total noematic unity which is the essential noematic structure of "X" is to be explained noetically. The infinite noemata remain unexplained and unexplainable within the theory of transcendental-phenomenological constitution.

9. It should be clear that the noetic and noematic essences here discussed are essences within the general essential structure of consciousness. In other words, an essential property of consciousness is its constitutional process. At the same time this essential constitutional process itself demands that whatever is described in terms of it must be described in its essential terms.

CHAPTER FIVE: TRANSFORMATION: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EIDETIC STRUCTURE OF ANY SPECIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS

1. OPERAND: ANY SPECIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS

Having established the general eidetic structure of the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint as constitutional[1] it is now possible to illustrate the establishment of the eidetic structure of any particular constitutional process.

The foregoing transformation has shown that consciousness is the consciousness of a reflexive transcendental ego. It has further shown that this consciousness is directed towards or intends the world as phenomena through the structure of intentionality. It is on the basis of this intentional relation to the world that the constitutional process operates.

Within this constitutional process subjective meaningful noetic acts of consciousness animate hyletic data. It is in and through this process that noematic unities or meant objects are constituted.

Since transcendental consciousness is essentially constitutive, any particular act of transcendental consciousness can be selected and examined for its particular constitutional makeup. It is the purpose of this chapter and transformation to illustrate this operation.

2. OPERATOR: CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

Given the intentional constitutional structure of transcendental consciousness in general, and given that necessarily any specific act of consciousness must therefore be structured intentionally and thereby participates in one constitutional process or another, any

specific intentional act and its correlate can be selected for eidetic analysis along intentional lines. The operator that engages in such eidetic analysis is called "constitutional analysis".

This operator is possible because of the essential "reflexivity" of transcendental consciousness, a reflexivity that was previously found to be necessary to the possibility of transcendental consciousness itself. What this means is that constitutional analysis itself is essentially reflexive since it operates upon transcendental consciousness and its relation to a meant world, and it is this turning towards consciousness that is reflexivity itself.

Consistent with the rather passive, implicit role that hyletic data play in the constitutional process, this operator will simply presuppose its functioning. It will simply presuppose that the sensory "raw material" present themselves for noetic animation. Consequently, this operation will largely ignore the problem of the description of the hyletic stratum. An exception to this rule will, however, present itself in the discussion of the "body-psyche" region.

Due to its orientation towards "the specification of essences, this operator turns out to be merely the "eidetic reduction" but with a bi-polar (i.e., noetic and noematic) orientation. In other words, it is merely an eidetic reduction that takes into consideration the intentional structure of consciousness and works within that structure.

Since the operator, constitutional analysis, is eidetic in its operation it begins with the selection of an example of the constitutional process or noematic region or object that has been selected for analysis. If, for instance, the region "material thing" were of interest, any

material thing, say a tree or stone, would be of equal interest.

In the case of the constitution of a region of reality, such a selection presupposes a preliminary definition or "directive idea" of the object or region under consideration. Such a definition need not be particularly clear and distinct since it is precisely constitutional analysis itself that is expected to provide such clarity and distinctness.

The operator, "constitutional analysis", here asks what noetic acts are necessary to the possible real existence of the noematic objectivity that has been selected. More specifically, it asks: what essential rules, noetic and noematic, are necessary to make the reality of something a possibility?

This focus upon those noetic acts that make the encounter of a "real" world (i.e., a meant world that has the "sense" of reality inherent in it) a possibility, is a subset of the total possible kinds of intentional acts of consciousness that could be *eidetically* examined by the operator, constitutional analysis. These kinds of acts are called acts of "reasonable encounter"[2]. Acts of "reasonable encounter" are those acts that deposit a sense of reality or existence in the noematic object.

The reason these acts of encounter are called "reasonable" reveals itself in the following. As previously demonstrated, all transcendental acts and the phenomenological objects towards which they are directed are the acts and objects of the natural attitude, except that they now have the "change of signature" (E. Husserl, 1969a:374,212) assigned to them by the operation of the epochē. In other words, they are the

same acts and objects under both attitudes, except that from the transcendental-phenomenological attitude I can no longer claim the "real spatio-temporal existence" of these acts and objects. The effect of this transformation of attitude is to retain the "natural attitude" as a field of research for transcendental phenomenology. To deny this is to empty the total field of transcendental-phenomenological research.

The point that this discussion permits me to make is that some natural attitude acts, having been placed between the "brackets" of the epochē (and consequently, in their capacity as the noetic field for transcendental-phenomenological study) involve a claim that they "encounter reality". It is an inherent part of such acts that they claim to "encounter reality" and that they claim that this is a "reasonable" assertion. This claim of "reasonableness" is made within the natural attitude and is subjected to constitutional analysis from the transcendental-phenomenological attitude. For example, from within the natural attitude it is "reasonable" to posit the "reality" of the desk that one is writing upon. From the transcendental-phenomenological attitude it is precisely those acts and their intentional relation to the desk as phenomenon, that is subjected to constitutional analysis.

Husserl contrasts these "reasonable encounters" with other acts of transcendental consciousness that intend merely illusory objects, those that only imagine objects etc., Constitutional analysis, here, is not interested in these "unreasonable encounters".

Recall, for a moment, the example introduced in the previous chapter

to illustrate the function of the "empty X" in relation to its noematic predicates. This is the example in which, in "pure phantasy", a "stone changes into a living creature, and then becomes invisible and dimensionless" (R. Sokolowski, 1970:151-152). This example can be used to show what Husserl means when he says that essential unities or structures "prescribe rules for reasonable encounter". As long as I do not claim that the entity, described in the example, exists, I am not thinking "unreasonably". However, if I assert that such an entity exists I would be making an unreasonable claim. This is because such variation violates the essential structures, "as rules of reasonable encounter" for "material things", of which the stone is an illustration. Such variation violates "the rule of reasonable encounter" regarding things. No strictly "material thing" is conceivable or possible as "animate and breathing", and then "suddenly invisible". So, while the objective unity "X" remains, the essential unity of this "X" is inconceivable without violating the "rules of reasonable encounter" for material things.

The presupposition here is that all "regions of being", such as the region of the "material thing" or the region of "psychophysical being", have their own "rules of reasonable encounter". Each of them, in other words have their own "essential structure".

Because of its eidetic orientation, the operator, constitutional analysis, must begin with the selection of a particular illustration. Such a selection in turn presupposes the selection of a particular general object or region of which this illustration is an instance. The illustrative object is varied in the imagination until the eidetic

limits are discovered. Once the noematic essential structure is so specified it becomes necessary to ask what noetic acts are essential to the possibility of the real existence of the essentially defined noematic structure. Such essential noetic and noematic structures define the rules for the reasonable encounter of the meant reality under consideration. These bi-polar essential conditions specify the rules that must be followed for a specific kind of encounter with a meant reality to be possible.

3. TRANSFORM: THE EIDETIC STRUCTURE OF ANY SPECIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS

The following brief illustration should help clarify how this constitutional process operates. In his discussion of the "purely formal" eidetic structures of transcendental consciousness in general (as opposed to the "material eidetic" structures that define a particular or "material region" towards which consciousness is directed) Husserl makes the following kinds of eidetic distinctions. At the noetic pole of the constitutional process Husserl describes the "doxic modalities"[3] (E. Husserl, 1969a:299) and at the correlative noematic pole the "modalities of being" (ibid.). Husserl argues that the "certainty of belief", or "certitude" i.e., "belief in its plain and simple form" (ibid.), noetically speaking, is the "unmodalized root-form of the way of belief" (ibid.:298). "Corresponding to this as its correlate [is] the ontical character pure and simple" (ibid.), the "noematic being certain or real" (ibid.) or actual. This ontical noematic character: being certain or real, "functions as the root-form of all modalities of being" (ibid.). In summary, noetically speaking, the "certainty of belief" is "the unmodalized root-form

of the doxic modalities, and correlatively the "noematic being certain or real" is the unmodalized root-form of the "modalities being".

Noetically, "certitude" is referred to as the "unmodalized root-form of the doxic modalities" because all other doxic modalities or "modalities of belief" presuppose this root-form. That is, they are inconceivable except against the "background" of a "certitude" or "certainty of belief". This will become more intelligible when the modalities of belief (doxic modalities) are correlated with the modalities of being, and this will be done shortly.

Correlatively, the being certain, real or actual (the noematic component) is referred to as "the unmodalized root-form of the modalities of being" because all other modalities of being presuppose this root-form. That is, they are inconceivable except against the "background" of the being certain, real or actual. This also will be clarified as the discussion proceeds.

At the noetic pole, the doxic modalities that presuppose the unmodalized root-form of the certainty of belief include, among others, the "questioning attitude" and the "doubting attitude" (ibid.:301). These latter two doxic modalities are grounded in this "primary belief" (ibid.:300), this "certainty of belief", this certitude. All the modalities of belief presuppose the un-modalized root-form of the "certainty of belief" and this essential insight is reflected in the term "Protodoxa" (*Urdoxa*). The term "Protodoxa [is selected] as suitably expressing the *intentional back-reference* of all modalities of belief... " (ibid.). So the following terms are used interchangeably

by Husserl: protodoxa, modalities of belief, and doxic modalities.

The grounding of the protodoxa or modalities of belief in the unmodalized root-form of belief and the correlative grounding of the modalities of being in the unmodalized root-form of being will be described next. Of course, due to the structure of intentionality that permeates the constitutional process the two "horizontal" groundings, just mentioned, also cut across the various "vertical" noetic groundings of their noematic correlates, as will be seen in the following.

This grounding in the primary or un-modalized belief means that any "questioning attitude" (a doxic modality) eidetically presupposes a "certainty of belief" (the unmodalized form of belief). This is a noetic, "horizontal", eidetic relation. This noetic, "horizontal" eidetic relation generates, in and through two intentional (i.e. "vertical") relations, the correlative noematic relation. More specifically, a "questioning attitude" (noetic act) deposits a noematic sense of the "problematical" in the noematic nucleus. Similarly, the "certainty of belief" (noetic act) deposits a noematic sense of "real or certain being" in the noematic nucleus. Between these two newly discovered noematic poles an eidetic relation also reveals itself. What this means is that the noematic sense of "problematical being" presupposes the noematic sense of "certain or real being". Problematical being is inconceivable except against a background of real or certain being. In general terms, every modality of being presupposes the unmodalized root-form of real or certain being.

The same kind of constitutional analysis could be presented for

the other doxic modalities such as the "attitude of supposition" or the "doubting attitude". Correlatively, at the noematic pole, "being possible... or doubtful [each appear] as a constitutive character of the object meant and in this sense predicable of it" (ibid.:301).

Here it can clearly be seen how Husserl proposes, through such constitutional analyses, to explain the origin of the noematic sense or meaning of the world. An act of certitude deposits a sense of certain or real being in the object. Similarly, an act of "questioning" (i.e., a "questioning attitude") deposits a sense of "problematical being", or being as questionable, in the object.

Another example of the constitutional process (at the formal level of the most general eidetic structures of consciousness) can be introduced that simply consists in the addition of another noetic "layer", with its noematic "layer", to the various doxic modalities and to the various correlative modalities of being. This new noetic layer is the act of "negation"[4]. "Every negation is the negation of something and this something points back to this or that modality of belief" (ibid.). This negation "of" something is a king of "intentionality" internal to the noetic level. This must not be confused with the "vertical" noetic-noematic intentionality that is the universal structure of the constitutional process. So, a noetic act of negation cancels the unmodified "certainty of belief" resulting in the creation of an "uncertainty belief". "Thus, noetically, negation is the 'modification' of some 'position',... in the extended sense of some form of belief modality" (ibid.:302). Correlatively, the negation

of the certainty belief which results in the "uncertainty belief" cancels the noematic being real, or being certain, to being not real or not certain. In Husserl's words: "through the transformation of the plain consciousness of being into the corresponding consciousness of negation, the plain character 'being' (*seiend*) turns in the noema into that of not being" (ibid.).

The same points apply to the other doxic modalities and their correlative modalities of being.

Next, a sketch of the constitution of various "regions of reality" will be introduced. The difficulty of providing detailed analyses of the constitution of various regions is aggravated by the rather sketchy, introductory treatment, in Husserl's published works, of specific regional researches. His need to provide an overview of the systematic unity of his overall theory resulted in the de-emphasis of the importance of applying his theory to particular research. As P. Ricoeur says, his need to provide a "formulation of the systematic unity of his work... [although] thwarted,... was... met by extensive expositions of doctrine" (1967:35). Consequently, "it is understandable that the expositions of his research should have been constantly sacrificed" (ibid.). So in his published works "exposition of doctrine" constantly took precedence over the application of this doctrine to specific researches. It is not until "*Ideas II* [that he] tests the method of intentional analysis" [constitutional analysis] advanced in *Ideas I* (ibid.:36). So the "programatic character of the theses of *Ideas I*" (ibid.) must be supported by "the expositions of his research... of *Ideas II*, subtitled *Phenomenological Invest-*

igations into the Constitution of Reality in Its Totality (ibid.:35, 36). However, the problem is that "even though complete, *Ideas II* remained unpublished" (ibid.:35) because of "endless reworkings and scruples over wording" (ibid.) making authoritative reliance on these attempts of doubtful value, although of course, their suggestive value for research is unquestionable. In addition, the unpublished manuscripts of *Ideas II* have not yet been translated into English. Consequently, the summary of *Ideas II*, provided by P. Ricoeur, (1967) will be used to exemplify the nature of particular researches in the area of the constitution of various regions.

Since my intention is merely to exemplify the kind of constitutional analyses that Husserl attempted, it is not my intention to provide a summary of these researches. My intention, instead, is to select aspects that illustrate regional constitutional processes. As a result aspects that, for example, concern themselves with "noematic reflections", in the sense of a one-sided constitutional analysis, will be excluded. An example of the result of such noematic reflections is the claim that the "natural" region is "causally" structured (E. Husserl, 1969a:415) while the "spiritual" region is governed by the principle of "motivation" (G. Berger, 1972:68).

This part of the transform dealing with regions of reality must be considered merely as a series of "titles" and their "relations" that are in need of development. This is true of Husserl's work on the constitution of "nature" and the "human spiritual world" since my summary of this work is based, unfortunately, on another summary by P. Ricouer. However, this limitation is not considered crucial

because the summaries presented here serve only to exemplify what is meant when the constitution of a region of reality is discussed, and to document in brief, Husserl's excursions into this area. Consequently, their role is not central to the aim of this thesis which is to present a general framework within which the question of the constitution of social action can be raised.

The section on the intentional constitution of social action must also be viewed as a series of "titles" and their relations. This limitation to the scope of this thesis is due to the rather exploratory level of my research to date in this area. The scope of this thesis, as will be recalled, was merely to define the framework within which the question of the constitution of social action can be raised. So, it is only necessary to outline a series of "titles and relations" that raise the appropriate constitutional questions and point to the possibility of further constitutional research in this area.

Husserl begins his regional constitutional analyses by taking, as his "transcendental guide", the "Kantian Idea"[5] of "reality in its totality" (P. Ricoeur, 1967:36). This "Idea" of "total reality" is in turn subdivided into two regions of reality: "reality as nature", and reality as "the human spiritual world" (ibid.:37). This is reminiscent of the distinction, current at the time, advocated by Dilthy, Windelband, Rickert, Simmel and others, between the "*Naturwissenschaften*" and the "*Geisteswissenschaften*" (ibid.:68). The region of "reality as nature" is further broken down into two "directive themes" or "guides": "material nature" and "animal or

psychic nature" (ibid.:37). This results in "three directive themes" or "regulative objects" (ibid.): material nature, animal or psychic nature, and the human spiritual world (*Geist*).

The problem then is "to seek to discover these objects at the terminus of the consciousness intending in which they are evidenced" (ibid.), i.e., "to speak about nature and reality transcendentally" (ibid.). What we have here is a "triple polarity" (ibid.:38) in which the three "regulative objects" are found at the noematic end of a noetic constituting process.

"The Idea of Nature in General" (ibid.:39) is the first to be subjected to constitutional analysis. When the noematic unity of "nature" is taken as a guide it becomes apparent, according to Husserl, that, noetically speaking, a "doxic-theoretic attitude" (ibid.:40) the natural scientific attitude (ibid.:41), is correlative with it. The point here is that the noematic sense of "naturalness", characteristic of "reality as nature" has its "origin" in the correlative transcendental noetic "doxic-theoretic attitude".

More specifically, the doxic-theoretic attitude is an "experience" or "*Erfahrung*" (ibid.) or "encounter" that includes at least two acts of consciousness. The first is the "doxic" element which is "a believing that posits its object as being" (ibid.). This "doxic" component is the "unmodalized root-form of the way of belief", discussed in the previous section. Husserl argues that this "certainty of belief" or "certitude" deposits a noematic eidetic meaning or sense of "being certain or real". This doxic act of consciousness deposits "the index of actuality" (ibid.:40) in the noematic unity, nature.

Consequently, as a result of this act of consciousness the phenomenon of nature carries a sense of actuality or reality within itself.

Secondly, this doxic theoretic attitude of the natural scientist includes a noetic act of exclusion or isolation in which the transcendental ego "proceeds by abstraction [noetic aspect] from all affective and practical aspects that reality owes to my evaluational... activity" (ibid.). This noetic act of abstraction leaves out of consideration other noetic acts of "evaluation" and their correlative noematic sense of "the good, the beautiful, the useful, and the valuable" (ibid.). "Man's evaluations do not interfere with the scientists concern; they are not constitutive of the Idea of Nature" (ibid.:41).

So the second noetic component of the doxic-theoretic attitude is an act of abstraction or isolation. This gives nature the noematic eidetic sense of an abstracted or partial segment of total reality. Also, since this noetic act of abstraction leaves out of consideration the noetic acts of evaluation, nature further acquires a negative noematic eidetic sense of being without beauty, use, value or ethical sense. What remains is a purely theoretic-doxic attitude towards a nature devoid of evaluational sense but having at the same time a sense of actuality.

So, it is this doxic-theoretic attitude of the natural scientist, with its "two-fold conscious performance [or] objectivation [that] circumscribes ā priori the field of nature" (ibid.).

Having discussed the problem of the constitution of "nature in general" Husserl now moves on to the problem of the constitution of

the region or sub-region within the region "nature in general": the region "material thing". However, because of the doubtful or, at best, secondary relevance of the constitution of this region to the problem of the consitution of social action, it will not here be discussed. Instead, the discussion will move more directly to the problem of the constitution of "animal or psychic nature", the "second regulative theme" or "object" within the region "reality as nature". Here the problem of the constitution of the "body-psyche" unity ("animal or psychic nature") arises.

The problem of the constitution of the body-psyche unity is divided into two problems. The first problem is the constitution of the "own body-psyche" unity; the second is the constitution of the "other's psyche".

Within the noetic "doxic-theoretic attitude" three noetic modalities play a prominent role in the constitution of the "own body-psyche unity" (animal-psyche unity). Firstly, a noetic act of exclusion, "omission or bracketing" (ibid.:60) "abstracts from mutual understanding,... from all we owe to intersubjectivity" (ibid.). This act of abstraction leaves a kind of "solipsistic experience" (ibid.). It leaves a noematic unity that is non-intersubjective.

Secondly, Husserl identifies a noetic act of "reification" (ibid.:52) or "incarnation" (ibid.:55) in which the "pure" or transcendental ego "objectivates" itself by placing itself "outside" in the form of a "human ego" (ibid.:52) or "object ego" (ibid.:55). Through this act of objectivation the pure ego with its total subjective life, noetic and hyletic, reifies itself in the human ego.

What this means is that "the psyche is not one entity constituted like the others, for it is the same ego, the same subjectivity, the same stream of subjective life... " (ibid.:52), the same transcendental subjective life, only now it has been reified in the form of a human ego. More precisely, a noetic act of objectivation, or reification, reifies the subjective life (both noetic and hyletic) of the transcendental ego. This noetic act deposits a noematic sense of a real or human ego with a real subjective life. Precisely how this is to be understood is not entirely clear, but husserl does point out that "the problem of incarnation emerges in contrast to [the] act of rejection [the epochē] in which philosophy begins" (ibid.:55). Consequently, it is somehow to be understood in contrast with the epochē, although not as a negation of it since we are here interrogating the constitution of the human ego from the transcendental perspective.

Since this human ego is "the same subjectivity" as the subjectivity of the pure ego, except that it is now to be understood as naturalized, the intentional life of pure subjectivity is also naturalized (ibid.). What we have here then is a reified subjective life, "a subject pole radiating all of its conscious intendings" (ibid.).

However, the reality of the human ego as an "embodied" psyche, and not merely as a reified psyche, is reached "by a double approximation" (ibid.:52). The noematic reality of the "body-psyche" is constituted in a noetic act of "interiorization" (ibid.:51). Here, the hyletic component of transcendental subjectivity plays a part in the constitution of the embodied psyche. More specifically, the

hyletic stratum of "touch" or "contact" is the "material" for the noetic act of interiorization.

The interesting thing about the sensation of touch is that there is a "double contact - of touching - touched" (ibid.:61). When something is touched the touching reveals not only the thing touched but also "simultaneously reveals my body as mine" (ibid.).

On the basis of the hyletic stratum of touch, and in association with the noetic act of interiorization or localization, the previously reified psychic life of the human ego is localized or interiorized as "spread out in the lived through spatiality of the body" (ibid.:62). In other words, "the body is lived through as the field of localization for the psyche" (ibid.).

It is through the noetic act of interiorization or localization that the hyletic sensation of touch becomes interiorized or localized as a psyche spread out in a human body. In fact, it is apparently through this act of interiorization that "the whole hyletic infrastructure of consciousness gives itself as immediately localized" (ibid.) in a human body, the noematic pole.

Since it is only the hyletic component that is localized in the body, "the intentive [noetic] moment as such is not localized" (ibid.). In other words, "the intentive subjective processes do not form a stratum of the body" (ibid.). In contrast, the "non-intentive infrastructure" has a "corporeal localization" (ibid.).

In summary, through the noetic eidetic acts of exclusion, reification, and interiorization, in association with the hyletic component of touch, a body-psyche unity is constituted, a noematic

unity that is eidetically characterized as non-intersubjective, real, and that has its psychic life spread out in the lived through spatiality of the body.

As previously indicated, within the constitution of the body-psyche unity, the problem of the constitution of the "other's psyche" also reveals itself.[6]

Here the first noetic act is an act of negation of the previously introduced noetic act of exclusion, or omission, a noetic act that excluded all aspects of "mutual understanding" (ibid.:60), a level that "abstracts... from all we owe to intersubjectivity" (ibid.). Consequently, the noematic intersubjective dimension of the region nature is re-included.

Husserl claims that the "other's psyche" is further constituted in a constitutional process that he calls "empathy" or "*Einfuhlung*" (ibid.:64). This constitutional process called "empathy" has as its hyletic "point of departure... the 'original' presence - *Urprasenz* - of the other's body" (ibid.:65).

Next, a noetic act of "pairing" or "*Paarung*" (ibid.), in which the original hyletic presence of the other's body is matched or paired with the already constituted noematic "own body" of the transcendental ego, is carried out. At the same time, as the previous discussion has shown, the own "body is lived through as the field of localization for the psyche" (ibid.:62). This localization of the psyche is due to the noetic act of interiorization in which the hyletic stratum of touch sensations are localized or interiorized in a body, yielding an animated body or body-psyche duality at the noematic pole.

This lived through constituted unity of body and psyche of the transcendental ego is referred to as "a total compresence of the psychic and the physical" (ibid.:65). On the basis of this "compresence", or localization of the psyche, a "spontaneous analogical activity" (ibid.) carries over (ibid.) in a noetic "process of transfer" (ibid.) of the own localized psyche to "all analogous bodies" (ibid.). In this process of transfer, in which the "localization of the psyche is carried over (*ubertragt sigh*) to all analogous bodies" (ibid.), the psyche of the other's body is not constituted as originarily present (*Urprasenz*). Instead, the other's psyche is constituted as "appresent" (ibid.). "It is exhibited only indirectly by the body of the other. It has not *Urprasenz* but rather *Apprasenz*"(ibid.). This is because the psyche "has originary presence only for a single person" (ibid.).

So this constitutional process of empathy constitutes the "appresence of the psyche of the other in his body [on the basis of a noetically] transferred compresence" (ibid.), a compresence in which the transcendental ego lives through his own "compresence of the psychic and the physical" (ibid.). Furthermore, the "range" of this transferred compresence "is boundless" (ibid.:66). For example, "the hand of the other that I see appresents to me the solipsistic touching of that hand and all that goes along with touching" (ibid.).

However, the constitution of the body-psyche unity, whether my own or an other's, leaves a "residue because the natural ego is not the equivalent of the real ego" (ibid.:68). That is, the "natural" body-psyche unity does not exhaust the totality of a human ego. In

other words, "the psyche animating the body is not equivalent to the cultural and communal realizations of man" (ibid.). Husserl "reads the opposition of the naturalistic world and the personalistic world in the appearance of man himself" (ibid.:70). What this means is that a focus upon the strictly natural body-psyche unity excludes that segment of the "real ego" that is involved "when we exchange experiences, or when we live in the family, the state, the church, etc. Here we do not see man as a being of nature but rather as a being of culture. We do not notice the animal [the body psyche] when we pay attention to the person" (ibid.).

Here the "transcendental guide" or "directive idea" (or "directive object") reveals itself. "The idea of spirit will serve as our transcendental guide" (ibid.:69). In fact, "the directive idea, which permits thematizing the categories of the human sciences is the pure ego of phenomenology" (ibid.:80). This, according to Ricouer results in "the most embarrassing question of *Ideas II*: that of situating exactly what in this work Husserl calls spirit (*Geist*) in relation to that which his works generally call 'consciousness', the subjective life of consciousness reached by the phenomenological reduction" (ibid.:76). This question arises since it is not "possible - not in the same way at least - to contrast the 'reality' of spirit to the transcendental ego. Spirit is not like a thing, nor even like the animate body and the psyche... " (ibid.:79), and yet it is ranked along side the "thing" and the "body-psyche" as one of the "three regulative objects" (ibid.:37). So the problem then is "where" to "situate exactly" this "spiritual realm" in relation to pure conscious-

ness and "natural reality".

Firstly, the consciousness of the pure transcendental ego is not equivalent to *Geist*. Instead, "*Geist* is nothing other than the ego of phenomenology [with its consciousness], but without the light of the phenomenological reduction" (ibid.:80). Consequently, "all the categories of the person and of sociality... are fundamentally the phenomenological categories and are found in *Ideas I* or in the *Cartesian Meditations*" (ibid.:78). Given these observations *Geist* or person is an "intermediary term between the pure ego and the psyche in its body" (ibid.:81).

Now, given this noematic region of reality called *Geist* or person the problem is to describe the constitutional processes in which the noematic sense of person or *Geist* is constituted. The aim, then, is to "make the sense 'person' appear" (ibid.:69). In other words, Husserl "aims at justifying [the human sciences, or *Geisteswissenschaften*] by giving them the foundations they lack, that is to say, the constitution of their sense" (ibid.:68).

The noetic act underlying all other noeses in this attitude is what Husserl calls the "spiritual attitude" (ibid.:74). In this attitude "somehow the spiritual imprints the physical with its sense to the point of annulling the duality of sense and its vehicle" (ibid.). That is, in some way, that Husserl apparently does not specify, "all of the objects of art and culture down to and including the humble utensils of everyday life are transmuted into an objectivity of a new sort which introduces them, along with consciousness, into the world of the spirit" (ibid.). Again precisely how this happens

and what kind of noeses and correlative noemata are implicated, is apparently not analyzed.

However, Husserl does introduce a noetic act of "understanding... as a particular case of... the spiritual attitude" (ibid.). "To understand in [Husserl's] language, applies very precisely to the grasping of a unity of spiritual sense in a diversity of nature" (ibid.). But precisely what sense is thereby deposited in the cultural object, or whether this in fact counts as an aspect of the constitution of spiritual reality, is not clear.

While a detailed examination of *Ideas II* would have yielded interesting distinctions, it is clear that the above illustrations do not amount to anything like a complete theory of the constitution of nature or *Geist*. Instead, these illustrations point merely to the kind of constitutional investigation that must ultimately be carried out in order to clarify the "sense" of "reality" and particularly the "sense" of social reality that can begin with the clarification of the constitutional sense of social action.

However, before the problem of the constitution of social action is outlined a brief digression dealing with the relation of the constitutional process as described in its general terms and the specific illustrations of this process presented above, seem unavoidable.

The examples of the constitutional process presented in chapter four above illustrate what I would like to call a "creative" constitutional process. This creative constitutional process includes the "doxic-modalities" and their correlative "modalities of being". Here for example, a noetic "questioning attitude" deposits a noematic sense

of the "problematical". Here the noematic sense of the "problematical" clearly derives its full sense from the noetic act of "questioning". Similarly, in chapter five above, a "spiritual attitude" somehow deposits a noematic sense of the "spiritual" in this region of reality.

These kinds of examples of the constitutional process seem to be consistent with Husserl's general discussion of the essence of the constitutional process. This "creative" constitutional process in which the noetic component completely explains its noematic correlate is consistent with Husserl's conception of the intentional constitutional process as an "animating" or "meaning giving" (E. Husserl, 1969a:284) function in which the noematic meaning derives its total sense from the "noetic stratum". It is consistent with Husserl's view that "this world, with all its objects... derives its whole sense and its existential status, which it has for me, from me myself, from me as the transcendental ego... " (E. Husserl, 1973a:26).

However, from the examination of other examples, another "weaker" constitutional process reveals itself. In contrast with the "creative constitutional process" described above the process to be described here could be called the "facilitative constitutional process". Here the noetic stratum provides the necessary conditions that make possible, or "facilitate" the emergence of, the correlative noematic sense. The noetic act of "pairing" does not deposit a noematic sense in the "creative" sense of the constitutional process, but instead, merely enters into a series of noetic acts that permits or facilitates the emergence of a noematic "appresent psyche" of an other. Here the

noetic act of "transfer" also becomes part of the noetic sequence in which the noematic sense of an "appresent psyche of an other" emerges.

My argument then is that there are at least two types of constitutional process. The first sense, the "creative" or "strong" sense is a purely "formal" process and the second "weaker" or "facilititave" sense tries to explain "more" of the object meant. It tries to explain it by simply specifying the noetic conditions necessary for the emergence of a certain noematic sense without really accounting for the "origin" of the sense (as does the "creative" type of constitutional explanation). So here, if there is an idealism of sense or meaning (the "creative" version of the constitutional process), it remains hidden. What this means is that it remains an open possibility that such a weaker constitutional explanation could ultimately be replaced by the stronger style of constitutional explanation.[7]

FOOTNOTES

1. The central role that the theory of constitution plays in this thesis is validated by the significance Husserl attaches to the need to address constitutional problems. For example, Husserl declares that "the greatest problems of all are the functional problems, or those of the constituting of the objective field of consciousness" (E. Husserl, 1969a:251).

2. The concept of a "reasonable encounter", as well as the associated discussion, in part takes its direction from Doctor R. Sokolowski's interpretation (1970: pages 150 to 159). However, this interpretation itself was tested against the material found in section four of Husserl's *Ideas* entitled: "*Reason and Reality (Wirklichkeit)*". What this means, of course, is that I am essentially in agreement with Doctor Sokolowski's interpretation.

3. This discussion concerning the "doxic modalities" and their correlative "modalities of being" is based upon Husserl's *Ideas*, pages 296 to 301.

4. This section on the noetic act of negation, with its correlative noematic component, is taken from E. Husserl's *Ideas*, pages 301 to 303.

5. Ricouer notes that for Husserl, a "Kantian idea is characterized by two properties: totality and openness" (1967:38,98).

6. This problem of the constitution of the other's psyche, as a natural reality, from the standpoint of transcendental subjectivity must not be confused with the problem of the constitution of other transcendental ego's as presented in Chapter Five of Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations*. In Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* the issue is to solve the problem of the constitution of other transcendental egos. This in turn is intended to solve the problem of objectivity in the sense of an objectivity that is the same for all. In P. Ricouer's words: "*Ideen II* does not use the understanding of others in order to resolve the entire philosophical problem of objectivity [i.e. from the standpoint of transcendental intersubjectivity] but applies it only to the limited problem of the constitution of the psyche" (1967: 65).

7. R. Sokolowski seems to feel that this facilitative type of

constitutional explanation is really the kind of constitutional process at work in Husserl's phenomenology. More precisely, Doctor Sokolowski states that "various senses and objects are simply given, and the study of their constitution is only the investigation of what subjective structures or processes are required as necessary conditions for the emergence, the coming-to-be of their specific forms of transcendence" (1970:166). He justifies his claim by saying that this maintains the "abyss of sense" (ibid.:138) between the immanent noetic and the transcendent noematic. However, Doctor Sokolowski ignores the repeated reference Husserl makes to the "meaning giving, animation" function of consciousness in which the "total sense of the world is to be explained subjectively". In addition, he ignores the kinds of examples of the stronger "creative" sense of constitution, presented above, where clearly the correlative eidetic noematic sense derives its full explanation from subjectivity.

FINAL REMARKS

ON THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE INTERPRETIVE UNDERSTANDING OF SOCIAL ACTION COULD YIELD A PHENOMENOLOGICAL FOUNDATION FOR INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY

Having discussed Husserl's theory of intentional constitution and some applications of it, and having shown how it emerges in and through a series of three related transformations, we can now begin to understand the question of the phenomenological foundation for interpretive sociology. This question of a phenomenological foundation turns out to be a constitutional question. In other words, the question of a phenomenological foundation for interpretive sociology can be addressed within the "third" transformation: "the Analysis of Any Specific Constitutional Process".

Furthermore, since the question of the phenomenological foundation for interpretive sociology can be addressed within this last transformation, this foundation itself derives its own foundation in and through its location in this framework. In other words, the framework, here presented in three transformations, is the "lower-stratum" foundation for the "higher-stratum" foundation that a constitutional analysis of the interpretive understanding of social action can provide for empirical interpretive sociology. So, empirical interpretive sociology can find its foundation in its constitutional structure[1] which in turn finds its own foundation through its place within the triple transformational "framework" of transcendental phenomenology, which, according to Husserl is "self-grounding".

In order to address the problem of the constitutional phenomenological foundation for social action it is necessary to begin with

a "transcendental guide" or "guiding clue" (E. Husserl, 1969a:411) or "regulative theme" for constitutional analysis. This was found to be the way in which Husserl began his analysis of the "regions of reality", discussed in the preceding chapter. Here his guiding clue was the "Idea of reality in its totality". This "Idea" of total reality was in turn sub-divided into two regions of reality: "reality as nature" and reality as "the human spiritual world". The region of "reality as nature" was further broken down into two further "guiding clues" or "directive themes": "material nature" and "animal or psychic nature", thus resulting in three guiding clues on the basis of which constitutional analyses were possible.

It is my proposal to take Weber's definition of social action as a "guiding clue" or "regulative theme" for constitutional analysis. The question of how and whether the so-called region of social action fits into the broad region of "reality in its totality", with its three sub-regions will not here be addressed.

As previously mentioned, Husserl's "regions" are based on distinctions existing at the time in philosophy and the sciences, thus making his specification of three guiding themes historically specific and consequently, in this sense somewhat arbitrary. Anyway, there does not seem to be any compelling reason for necessarily accepting this definition of the regions of reality. This makes the definition of social action, as a guiding clue for a region of reality, no more arbitrary than Husserl's own divisions.

Furthermore, a delineation of the various regions of reality that shows the eidetic properties that define each region as well as

the relations between them, not to mention the transcendental subjective correlates that delineate these regions, is certainly not the kind of knowledge that is presupposed in advance. Instead, such knowledge comes only after extensive constitutional analyses. Husserl's own analyses in *Ideas II* were presented by him as mere introductory explorations of the transcendental constitution of the regions of reality. Consequently, since the preliminary research presented in this thesis is somewhat exploratory, to say the least, the preliminary use of the definition of social action as a provisional guide for constitutional analysis seems harmless enough.

Now, it may be objected that Weber's definition of social action is too vague or obscure to serve as a guiding clue for constitutional analysis. On the contrary, it is precisely constitutional analysis itself that is to determine the clear and distinct definition of social action. Consequently, as Husserl states, all that is necessary to begin one's analysis is a more or less "obscure", "verbal" (ibid.: 412) presentation of the phenomenon to be analyzed constitutionally.

It may also be questioned whether or not the definition of social action, whether obscure or clear and distinct, can become an object of constitutional enquiry at all. The possibility of the constitutional analysis, from a transcendental-phenomenological perspective, of social action as a phenomenon, reveals itself the moment the epochē comes into play. This is becuase after the epochē we "have literally lost nothing" (ibid.:154); "that whatever is phenomenologically disconnected remains still, with a certain change of signature, within the framework of phenomenology" (ibid.:374, 212). Elsewhere he further

states that "... the whole world, with its psychic individuals and its psychic experiences - all this as correlate of the absolute consciousness - falls in modified form within phenomenology" (ibid.: 213). Consequently, social action is as much a topic of interest from the transcendental-phenomenological perspective, i.e. as a "correlate of absolute consciousness" (i.e. as a noematic unity) as it was for Weber from the perspective of empirical science.

To further illustrate the context in which a transcendental phenomenology of social action is possible the following quotation from Husserl's *Ideas I* is offered: assuming the operation of the epochē,

> physical nature suffers disconnexion, whilst notwithstanding we continue to have not only a phenomenology of the natural scientific consciousness on the side of its thought and experience, but also a phenomenology of nature itself as correlate of the natural scientific consciousness. Similarly, although psychology and mental science are affected by the disconnexion, we have a phenomenology of man, his personality, personal qualities, and his conscious course (as a human being) a phenomenology, further, of the mind of the community, its social institutions, its cultural creations, and so forth (ibid.:212-3).

The above reference to "a phenomenology of the natural scientific consciousness" and its correlate "nature", of course, anticipates the constitutional studies of *Ideen II* (previously introduced) wherein the "region of nature" was correlated with a transcendental noetic "theoretic-doxic attitude". Similarly, the reference to "a phenomenology of man, his personality", and to "a phenomenology of the mind of the community, its social institutions, and its cultural creations" anticipates the constitutional studies of *Ideen II* wherein the "region of *Geist*" was correlated with a transcendental noetic "spiritual attitude". So, within such a context, a phenomenology of social action

is not inconceivable.

The possibility of the study of social action from a transcendental-phenomenological perspective is further supported by what Husserl calls the "general principle" that "each individual event has its essence that can be grasped in its eidetic purity, and in this purity must belong to a field available to eidetic inquiry" (ibid.:115). This suggests that a particular social action can be treated like any other "individual" event - as a member of a "field available to eidetic inquiry" (i.e. tentatively, the "field" or "region" of social action). This characterization of social action as a "field" or "region" does not exclude the possibility that subsequent constitutional analysis will correct this preliminary characterization by showing that it is made up of, perhaps, several regions or is really part of a larger all-encompassing region.

Husserl states that we must "study in the most general comprehensive way how objective unities of every region... are consciously constituted" (ibid.:253). As Gaston Berger states, the "phenomenologist takes as a 'guideline' a certain region of the world... and he is going to seek the transcendental acts to which its features correspond" (1972:85-6). In this context it is my proposal to introduce the "Idea" of social action as a "guideline" for a region or "field available to eidetic inquiry" along constitutional lines and thereby "to seek the transcendental acts to which its features correspond".

As previously mentioned, Weber's definition of social action, however "obscure", can be used as the "Idea" of a region of reality, as a "transcendental guide" or "regulative theme" on the basis of

which a constitutional analysis can begin. Weber defines social action in the following way: "action is social in so far as, by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the individual (or individuals), it takes account of the behaviours of others and is thereby oriented in its course" (1964:88).

On the basis of this preliminary "Idea" of the noematic region of social action some provisional directions for further constitutional research become evident. Probably the most striking feature of this region is that it appears to be structured "intentionally"[2]. This intentionality should, however, not be confused with the intentionality that describes the relation of transcendental consciousness to that which it is conscious of. The intentionality that is referred to here is more akin to the "natural intentionality" (P. Ricouer, 1967:55) introduced above, in the discussion of the constitution of the region of the body-psyche unity.

The intentional structure of this region of social action becomes evident when one notes that the "orientation" referred to above is always an orientation towards something and it is precisely this kind of relation that is intentionality. Accordingly, one can argue that some kind of orientational "acts" are directed towards[3] something called "others". Consequently, one could argue that an "act of orientation" deposits a noematic sense of "the oriented towards" upon this other.

Similarly, a further examination of the definition of social action as a preliminary "Idea" of the region of social action reveals another intentional structure. This intentional structure can be

seen in the "meaning attachment" function. If the "subjective meaning" is taken as a noematic sense, then necessarily some kind of "acts of subjective meaning attachment" must be correlative with it. The difficult question for a constitutional analysis here is precisely what kind of noetic acts and "act strata" are necessary for the possible emergence of a noematic sense of subjective meaning. The question, when posed in this manner interprets the constitutional process in the "weaker", "facilitative" sense previously described. If the "stronger", "creative" interpretation of the constitutional process is assumed then the question becomes: what noetic acts deposit a noematic sense of "subjective meaning"?

Further reflection upon these intentional structures suggests that an "act of orientation" and an "act of subjective meaning attachment" includes or implies the "primary doxic modality" of "the way of belief" (discussed above). What I mean by this is that both an "act of orientation" and a "subjective meaning attachment" necessarily presupposes the "reality" or "certain being" of whatever one is oriented towards or attaches subjective meaning to. This noematic "certain or real being" has its "origin" explained by pointing to the "primary doxic modality" of "certitude" or "certainty of belief". In other words, an act of "certain belief" deposits a sense of certain or real existence upon the "other".

It must be remembered, however, that these very preliminary and sometimes rather vague determinations are presented merely as provisional directions for further constitutional research.

The above determinations are strictly "internal" to the region

of social action. The question, consequently, arises as to the kind of transcendental noetic acts that are correlative with this region. Consequently, we must distinguish between the "lower-level" constitutional questions that are internal to the region of social action and the "higher-level" constitutional questions that enquire about the transcendental noetic acts that are correlative to this noematic region.

At the higher-level noetic pole the whole problem of "interpretive understanding" or "*Verstehen*" (M. Weber, 1964:88) presents itself as a "title" that demands intensive eidetic constitutional research. This is so because it is Weber's claim that social action somehow becomes accessible in and through something called interpretive understanding. In other words, interpretive understanding demands further constitutional analysis because it is structured intentionally. That is, interpretive understanding is always an understanding *of* social action. Consequently, this whole "higher-level" intentional relation between interpretive understanding and social action must be subjected to intensive constitutional analysis along eidetic lines. It is only through such an analysis that the essential structure of this relation can be established.

By introducing social action as a provisional noematic region for phenomenological research from a transcendental perspective, it by definition makes all subjective acts that claim to encounter this region "noetic acts" and consequently acts of the transcendental ego. Consequently, acts of interpretive understanding become noetic acts of the transcendental ego. This consequently, also holds true for

Weber's distinction between "*aktuelles Verstehen*" and "*erklarendes Verstehen*"[4] (ibid.:94) which might be interpreted as noetic modalities of the undifferentiated noetic act of interpretive understanding. My point is that this intentional relation is in great need of constitutional analysis since, as T. Burger indicates, Weber never presented a theory of interpretive understanding (in spite of the fact that he called his sociology an "interpretive sociology") but instead simply took it for granted that social action was accessible to such acts (1976:107).

The constitutional question at this higher-level then becomes: what noetic acts lie concealed in these acts of interpretive understanding? Do acts of "*aktuelles Verstehen*" or "*erklarendes Verstehen*" point to the kinds of noetic acts that here lie concealed? Since such acts apparently encounter social action at their noematic pole the constitutional question further becomes: given whatever eidetic structures lie concealed at the level of the region of social action (like the eidetic structure: intentionality and its modalities of orientation and subjective meaning attachment, for example), what noetic acts are correlative with this eidetic noematic structure?

This constitutional analytic question can be asked either in the "weaker, facilitative" sense or in the "stronger, creative" sense. In the weaker sense the question becomes: firstly, what is the eidetic structure of the noematic region of social action? Secondly, given this noematic eidetic structure, what noetic acts are necessary to the possibility or conceivability of the eidetic structure of this region? Thirdly, given this noetic-noematic correlativity, what

hyletic aspects are implicated in this constitutional process?

In the "stronger, creative" sense the first and third questions remain the same. The second question becomes: given the eidetic structure of the noematic region of social action, what noetic acts explain the *origin* of the noematic eidetic properties of this region? In other words, given the eidetic noematic structure of the region of social action, the problem is to discover those noetic acts that account for the *origin* of this noematic eidetic meaning structure by pointing to those acts that "deposit" or give sense or meaning to this region. One such noetic act could be the "primary doxic modality", the "certainty of belief", that deposits a noematic meaning or sense of "real or certain existence" in the region of social action.

However, it must be remembered that it is only my intention to outline the constitutional questions that must be addressed if the interpretive understanding of social action is ever to reach a satisfactory clarification. It is *not* my intention even to provide preliminary answers to these questions. Instead, the examples or "titles" here introduced serve only to show the *direction* that such constitutional analyses can take.

In order to answer these constitutional questions the operator, constitutional analysis, must begin with the "Idea" of the region of social action. The recommendation here is that this "Idea" of the region of social action can be taken from Weber's definition. Next, at least one example of this phenomenon of social action must then be selected. Through the "eidetic reduction" (which defines the operation of the operator, constitutional analyses) the example is

varied freely in the imagination until its eidetic limits are reached. Next, its correlative eidetic noetic acts are specified. Also, consistent with the structure of the intentional constitutional process, the hyletic element must also be defined in eidetic terms. At the hyletic level the problem becomes: what kind of sensations are implicated in the interpretive understanding of social action?

In summary, the constitutional problem set seems to have a "bi-level" structure. At the "lower" level of the region of social action the problem is: what noetic acts are correlative with what noematic phases. Given its intentional structure the hyletic element must also be described eidetically. However, this noetic-hyletic-noematic vocabulary must not be confused with the "higher" level structure of intentionality that relates the transcendental ego to this noematic region of social action (with its own internal intentional structures).

Now, given this "lower" level constitutional problem set the "higher" level problem set reveals itself. Given the essential structure of this lower-level noematic region, the higher level problem set asks what transcendental noetic acts are correlative with it and what hyletic aspects are implicated in this constitutional process. Again, this question can be asked either in the "strong" sense or the "weak" sense. So, we have a bi-level constitutional problem set.

The argument is that the solution to this bi-level constitutional problem set would provide a phenomenological foundation for the empirical science of interpretive sociology. In terms of the structure of this thesis, the question of a phenomenological foundation for interpretive sociology can be addressed within the "third" transform-

ation: "The Analysis of Any Specific Constitutional Process".

This constitutional foundation would define the essential invariant properties that specify the rules or norms that make the experience of social action a possibility. Such essences or rules are the "principles which... functions as norms governing the whole enterprise of empirical science" (E. Husserl, 1964a:46). For example, social action may only be experiencable through some kind of noeses of interpretive understanding. If this ultimately proves to be the case it would amount to an eidetic rule for the experience of social action or at least the label for a number of such rules. Such eidetic structures would give guidance to any empirical scientific research by specifying the eidetic constitutional structure that every actual conscious relation to this region must have in order to qualify as a consciousness of that particular region and no other. It would specify those eidetic properties that make the consciousness of the region of social action a possibility.

However, in order to better understand this concept of a foundation at least four usages must be distinguished. The first usage points to the constitutional structure in its entirety and its *foundational* relation with empirical science. This points to the "old ontological doctrine, that the knowledge of 'possibilities' must precede that of actualities (*Wirklichkeiten*)... " (E. Husserl, 1969a:232). Here the claim is that the eidetic constitutional properties of the consciousness or interpretive understanding of social action makes the consciousness of social action conceivable or possible. All actual conscious relations to social action must be consistent with this eidetic structure

because it defines the limits for any encounter with it. Here the "knowledge of possibilities precedes that of actualities".

Secondly, within this constitutional structure of the interpretive understanding of social action, transcendental subjectivity (noetic and hyletic) *founds* or grounds the noematic pole by showing what the noematic pole presupposes in our encounter with it. This can be characterized as a "vertical" constitutional grounding.

Thirdly, within the noetic level noeses are *grounded* in other noeses. For example, an act of negation presupposes or is founded in a doxic modality. That is, every act of negation negates a "certainty of belief" or a "questioning attitude" etc. Similarly, noemata are *grounded* in or presuppose other noemata. These can be characterized as "horizontal" constitutional groundings.

Fourthly, all of the above three usages fall within the third transformation: The Analysis of Any Specific Constitutional Process". Consequently, the whole constitutional structure of the interpretive understanding of social action lies embedded in the three transformation "framework" of this thesis. Since the problem of the interpretive understanding of social action is structured constitutionally, i.e. since it falls within the structure of the third transformation, this problem and its ultimate solution is in turn *grounded* in the structure of transcendental phenomenology itself, as defined in terms of the three interlocking transformations. In other words, the constitutional structure of the interpretive understanding of social action, which is to provide a foundation for the empirical science of interpretive sociology, in turn derives its foundation in and

through its place within transcendental phenomenology which is, according to Husserl, "self-grounding".

FOOTNOTES

1. At this point it may be instructive to compare the central role the theory of constitution plays in this thesis with the role it plays in Schutz's phenomenology. While it is Schutz's goal "to give to interpretive sociology a philosophical [i.e. phenomenological] foundation"(A. Schutz, 1967:43), it is not clear whether this is in fact to be a constitutional foundation. While Schutz does make use of the concept of constitution (ibid.:8,12,13,38, 41 etc.), nowhere does he describe its structure or the centrality of the part it plays in the establishment of a phenomenological foundation for interpretive sociology. The central role that the theory of constitution plays in phenomenology is clearly affirmed by Husserl (1969a:251). This is also the concensus of several students of Husserl (e.g. G. Berger, 1972:9; R. Sokolowski, 1970:1).

To illustrate Schutz's de-emphasis of the constitutional process, with its orientation towards the constitution of objectivity, it should be noted that neither the term *constitution* nor the term *objectivity* or their derivatives can be found in the index of *The Phenomenology of the Social World*. The significance of this comment is enhanced if one considers the note preceding the index: "Subject-matter entries refer only to crucial or extended discussions of the topics in question" (1967:253). Obviously, the concept of constitution is not "crucial". Neither is there "extended discussion" devoted to this concept. This, in spite of the fact that Husserl clearly states that "... the greatest problems of all are the functional problems, or those of the constituting of the objective field of consciousness" (1969a:251).

2. The importance of this insight for the theory of social action is supported by the fact that the theory of intentionality is probably the central concept in Husserl's phenomenology. As Husserl puts it: "the name of the problem which inspires all of phenomenology is intentionality" (E. Husserl, 1969a:404). This introduces the possibility that study of the region of social action can benefit from all the analyses that centre around the concept of intentionality whether carried out by Husserl or his successors.

3. Robert Sokolowski in fact claims that "being directed towards" (1970:50) is one of the "two functions" of intentionality (the "animation" function being the other).

4. These terms are translated by A. M. Henderson and T. Parsons as "direct observational understanding" and "explanatory understanding" (M. Weber, 1964:94-95).

SUMMARY

The introduction to this thesis stated that the purpose of this work was "to present a transcendental-phenomenological *framework* within which the *question* of the phenomenological constitutional *foundation* for the empirical science of interpretive sociology can be raised". This section will present a summary statement of this framework. It will also show briefly how the question of the phenomenological constitutional foundation for interpretive sociology can be raised from within this framework. Consequently, this section will present an overview of the form the achievement of the purpose of this thesis has taken.

At the formal level, this framework was structured by means of three interrelated transformations. A transformation consisted of an operator-operand-transform sequence. The operator acted or operated upon the operand, and this was referred to as an operation. This operation yielded a transform. Except for the order of their appearance, each transformation is identical. This ordering is such that the third transformation presupposes the second and the first, and the second transformation presupposes the first. This three part transformational structure formally orders, limits and unifies the framework that is the central achievement of this thesis.

This formal transformational structure was then "fleshed out" with phenomenological concepts. More precisely, transcendental-phenomenological concepts are "mapped-onto", or placed in correspondence with, the purely formal transformational structure. These two strata (formal and conceptual) together define the "framework"

that is the central achievement of this thesis.

This bi-strata framework, however, in addition points to a third stratum. This third stratum presupposes the validity of the foundation specified in the first two strata (the bi-stratum framework). More specifically, since this bi-stratum framework is a framework within which specific constitutional foundational questions can be raised, this framework points beyond itself to the actual regional constitutional phenomenological foundations that can be established (the third stratum). It is on this third stratum that the problem of the foundation for interpretive sociology can in principle be solved. Since a complete phenomenological foundation for interpretive sociology would be made up of these three strata, the bi-stratum framework presented in this thesis is itself foundational for the foundation here proposed (although not described) for interpretive sociology.

To complete this heirarchy, a fourth stratum must be added: the empirical science of interpretive sociology that could in principle be developed on the basis of the underlying three strata foundation.

The empirical science of interpretive sociology gets its guidance, direction or foundation from the constitutional structure of the interpretive understanding of social action (stratum three). This constitutional structure in turn gets its foundation from the transcendental-phenomenological framework (strata one and two). Within this framework, stratum one (the formal transformational structure) also supplies a foundational function for the other three strata. So, from stratum four down, each stratum *presupposes* the stratum that

precedes it. Each higher stratum gets its foundation from the stratum that lies below it.

Finally, the framework itself (strata one and two) is structured so that each subsequent transformation *presupposes* the preceding transformation(s). This thereby orders and limits the framework itself.

The following material will summarize this three transformational framework. The first transformation describes the operation used to establish a transcendental-phenomenological standpoint. This operation begins with what Husserl calls the "natural attitude". The natural attitude is merely the general perspective or attitude assumed by every human being in his everyday life, including the scientific life towards the world, towards theories, corporeal things, animals, other human beings as embodied subjects like myself, values, practicalities etc. It is the attitude of natural human existence. This natural attitude assumes the existence of an objective spatio-temporal fact-world, a world that is there for all and to which I myself belong. This "existence of a spatio-temporal fact-world" serves as a basis or support for all my judgments about this world whether these are affirmations, denials, doubts, evaluations, theories, approvals, decisions, actions etc. This natural attitude defines the perspective or position taken by us all throughout our natural every-day existence. Within the natural attitude we assume the existence of a spatio-temporal fact-world.

The operator Husserl uses in this first transformation is called

the *epochē*. The *epochē* is a bracketing that prevents me from assuming the validity of whatever is enclosed in the brackets for subsequent operations. However, it does not prevent me from viewing what is bracketed in its capacity as bracketed.

The *epochē* operates upon the natural attitude and thereby brackets the essence of this attitude. The essence of this attitude is "the general thesis of the natural attitude". This general thesis is the judgment or thesis that a spatio-temporal fact world exists. Since it is bracketed I cannot use it as a basis for my judgments. The *epochē* prevents me from introducing a proposition which explicitly or implicitly contains a reference to a spatio-temporal fact world. So, the negative transform is the bracketed general thesis of the natural attitude.

Having bracketed all reliance on the assumption that a spatio-temporal fact world exists we are faced with a reliance on whatever emerges as a result of this bracketing. If one is forced to leave out of consideration a reliance on the existence of a spatio-temporal fact world, one is left with a "pure, pregnant consciousness", i.e., one that does not assume its own spatio-temporal existence, but one that nevertheless remains actively intact.

Husserl, states that this pure consciousness is "absolute", as well as "apodictic" in two senses. Firstly, it is apodictic in the Cartesian sense in which *its non-existence is inconceivable*. Its existence is apodictic because if I doubt its existence I am forced to doubt the existence of my very doubting, and this, of course, is absurd. Secondly, consciousness is *given* apodictically. This means

that consciousness cannot present itself through profiles or perspective patterns, like material objects. It is given directly, in an unmediated fashion, it is given apodictically.

Consciousness is "absolute" in the sense that its existence is *independent* of a spatio-temporal fact world. While the world cannot be conceived of apart from a consciousness of it, pure consciousness is independent of the world's existence, i.e., it has an "absolute" existence. This absolute character of pure consciousness is in contrast with the dependent or relative status of the world.

By referring to this pure consciousness as "transcendental" an epistemological orientation is introduced. The term "transcendental" merely points to the motif of inquiry which directs its attention "back into the ultimate source of all the formations of knowledge, the motif of the knower's reflecting upon himself and his knowing life". It directs the attention to the life of pure consciousness as the source of all the formations, conditions or principles of the knowing process.

Since the *epochē* only prevents us from presupposing the validity of the general thesis of the natural attitude, it only brackets a particular way of looking at this world; it does not thereby eliminate this world from view. Instead, the same world is available for inquiry but from a new perspective: the transcendental-phenomenological perspective. This same world when viewed from this new perspective is what Husserl calls "phenomena".

At this point the second transformation becomes operative. It is directed towards the establishment of the eidetic (essential)

structure of the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint. The operand of this second transformation is merely the positive transform of the first transformation: the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint.

The operator of this second transformation is the "eidetic reduction". It operates through the selection of an illustration or example and then subjects it to a free-variation in the imagination. It is through this method that essential necessities are uncovered. These essential necessities are the invariant properties, the identical properties that remain the same through countless variations in the imagination. An essential necessity is the principle, norm or frame that determines the boundaries of the example under examination. Husserl also refers to an essential necessity as an ā priori form. Such an eidetic necessity makes whatever it refers to possible, without it its referent would be inconceivable.

Through the operation of the operator: eidetic reduction, upon the operand: the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint, the content of the transform is established. This transform is the eidetic structure of the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint. The eidetic structure of the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint is primarily a constitutional structure within which constitutional processes operate.

Through the operation of the eidetic reduction upon any particular illustrative act of consciousness, it is immediately apparent that I am able to "reflect" upon this illustrative act of consciousness. Therefore, "reflexivity" is an eidetic property of transcendental

consciousness, without which it would be inconceivable.

The eidetic reduction also reveals that acts of transcendental consciousness are acts carried out by an "Ego". This transcendental ego operates as a necessary unifying principle for consciousness. Without a transcendental ego to unify consciousness, acts of consciousness would float freely and independently of one another. The self-identity or sameness of the ego is necessary to all real and possible variations of consciousness, as an invariant property against which such variation is made possible.

Through the operation of the eidetic reduction upon any illustrative act of consciousness in general, it becomes evident that consciousness is necessarily "intentional". The property "intentionally" means that consciousness in general and therefore every individual act of consciousness is always a "consciousness *of* something". Intentionality itself is organized according to a "noetic-hyletic-noematic" structure.

The noetic component is essentially a non-sensory subjective component and includes acts of consciousness such as: thought, belief, doubt, valuation, judgment etc. The essential thing about these noeses or noetic phases is that they are "meaningful". Husserl nowhere defines in general terms what is to be understood by the term "meaning". A brief illustration of what he means will, however, be presented after the hyletic and the noematic components are summarized.

The second subjective component is the "hyletic". These are "sensory contents such as the data of colour, touch, sound, pleasure, pain, tickling, etc." Like noeses, hyletic data belong to the level

of pure consciousness. So transcendental consciousness is made up of two basic components: the noetic and the hyletic. However, here a problem arises for Husserl. While Husserl clearly indicates that consciousness is always "intentional" he at the same time says that the hyletic component is not intentional. Consequently, either the hyletic component must be placed outside of consciousness or we have a contradiction since consciousness cannot be both intentional and non-intentional. The unavoidable solution at this point seems to be to place the hyletic component outside of consciousness in order to remove the contradiction.

According to Husserl, hyletic data have noetic "meanings" bestowed upon them through an intentional "animation" function. The result of the operation of this noetic meaning bestowing stratum upon the hyletic stratum is a "noematic" stratum. The epochē prevents me from claiming that this noematic stratum is other than "mere intentional being". In other words, through the operation of the epochē we effect a reduction to our pure meaning (noetic meaning) and to the meant, purely as meant (noemata). For example, the "valuation" (noetic meaning) gives the character of the "valued" (noematic meaning) to a particular set of hyletic data (colour, for example).

In summary, the eidetic structure of this new standpoint is in part defined in terms of a reflexive transcendental ego that relates itself to a meant world in and through the structure of intentionality.

It is within this eidetic structure that the "constitutional process" operates. The theory of constitution is a theory that claims to provide a general structure within which an objectivity or objective

region can be given a subjective grounding or explanation.

The purpose of the theory of constitution is to explain the noematic meanings of an object by showing how these meanings "*originate*" in noetic acts of consciousness through the intermediate hyletic stratum.

At the noematic pole the total objective nucleus (noematic object) has two distinguishable components: and "empty X" and the noematic predicates that "attach" themselves to this empty "X". However, the theory of constitution is interested only in the eidetic character of the total noematic nucleus. Therefore, it is not interested in contingent, inessential properties. The eidetic character of the noematic nucleus is understood in terms of "limits" or "channels" within which "infinite noematic variations are possible".

Now, this essential noematic unity is to be explained by describing the noetic acts that "correspond" or "parallel" the manifold of eidetic noematic properties. In this explanatory constitutional process hyletic data are "animated" by noetic meaning bestowing acts. Through this animation function, noematic objectivities or regions are constituted.

So the problem of the theory of constitution, in general terms, is to explain noetically, through the medium of hyletic data, the possibility of essential noematic unities. The problem is to find those noetic essential conditions that make possible the particular kind of noematic essential sense of transcendence that a particular kind of object or region has.

In summary, the eidetic structure of the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint is primarily a constitutional structure within

which constitutional processes operate.

Having established that the eidetic structure of the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint is primarily a constitutional structure within which constitutional processes operate, the operand of the third transformation becomes: "any specific constitutional process". The third transformation is directed towards "the establishment of the eidetic structure of any specific constitutional process". The operator of this third transformation is called "constitutional analysis". This operator selects any specific constitutional process (the operand) and subjects it to eidetic analysis. As such it is merely the eidetic reduction, but an eidetic reduction that takes into consideration the intentional structure of consciousness with its noetic-hyletic-noematic structure. However, consistent with the rather passive, implicit role that hyletic data play in the constitutional process, the operator constitutional analysis (in this thesis) will simply presuppose that sensory "raw material" present themselves for noetic animation. However, a more complete constitutional analysis would have to take all three components into consideration.

The operation of the operator: constitutional analysis, on the operand: any specific constitutional process, yields the transform: the eidetic structure of any specific constitutional process. In this section, a range of examples that illustrate constitutional eidetic structures were presented. At the "purely formal" (non-regional level) the "doxic modalities" with their correlative "modalities of being" were introduced. At the noetic pole "certitude" was introduced as the "unmodalized root-form of the doxic modalities". Correlatively, the

being real or actual (the noematic component) was introduced as "the unmodalized root-form of the modalities of being". In addition, horizontal eidetic relations were identified at both poles. For example, a noetic "questioning attitude" was eidetically related to the unmodalized root-form: "certitude". The correlative noematic eidetic relation between "real or certain being" and "problematical being" was also presented in relation to the corresponding noetic eidetic relation.

Next, a *sketch* of the constitution of various "regions of reality" was introduced. In this context, the "Idea" of "total reality" was taken as a "transcendental guide". Husserl, divides this idea of total reality into two regions: "reality as nature", and "reality as the human spiritual world". The region of reality as nature was further sub-divided into two regions: "material nature" and "animal or psychic nature". Then the several noematic regions were briefly subjected to constitutional analysis. The result was merely a structure of eidetic *titles* that point to further research. These titles merely suggest the direction that further research can take. They will not be summarized here because of their secondary importance to the purpose of this thesis, and because their presentation in the body of the thesis is already a summary that is difficult to further summarize.

However, based on the presentation of these illustrative constitutional analyses two types of constitutional process were identified. The first is a "creative" or "stronger" type of constitutional explanation. Here the noetic act completely explains its noematic correlate. The second is a "weaker" or "facilitative" type of constitutional

explanation. Here the noetic stratum provides the necessary conditions that make possible or, "facilitate" the emergence of, the correlative noematic sense.

Having presented the three transformational structure with its corresponding phenomenological conceptions, the "framework", that is the central achievement of this thesis, has been summarized.

Having introduced the three transformation framework, and having shown how the problem of the establishment of the eidetic structure of any specific constitutional process identifies the *third* transformation, one can now address the question of the possibility of further constitutional research from *within* this third transformation. More specifically, my argument here is that the "constitutional analysis of the interpretive understanding of social action could yield a phenomenological foundation for interpretive sociology". The constitutional analytic question can be asked in either the "weaker, facilitative" sense or in the "stronger creative sense".

In the weaker facilitative sense the question becomes: firstly, what is the eidetic structure of the noematic region of social action? Secondly, given this noematic eidetic structure, what noetic acts are necessary to facilitate the emergence of the eidetic structure of this region? Thirdly, given this noetic-noematic correlativity, what hyletic aspects are implicated in this constitutional process?

In the "stronger, creative" sense the first and third questions remain the same. The second question becomes: given the eidetic noematic structure of the region of social action, what noetic acts account for the "*origin*" of this noematic eidetic structure. This

is done by identifying those noetic acts that "animate", "deposit" or give sense or meaning to this noematic region.

The direction that such research can take was shown by introducing "titles" that are intended to serve only a heuristic function.

As indicated earlier, the formal transformational structure (stratum one) is the foundation for the transcendental-phenomenological conceptions (stratum two) that were "mapped" onto this formal structure. Together these two strata define the "framework", the central achievement of this thesis. This bi-stratum framework is the foundation for actual regional constitutional processes (the third stratum). It is on this third stratum that the problem of the foundation for interpretive sociology can in principle be solved. It is on this third stratum that the problem of the phenomenological constitutional structure of the interpretive understanding of social action can in principle be solved. The three strata together would provide a transcendental-phenomenological constitutional foundation for the empirical science of interpretive sociology (the fourth stratum).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BACHELARD, S. 1968 — *A Study of Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic.* Evanston, Northwestern University Press. Translated by L. E. Embree

BERGER, G. 1972 — *The Cogito in Husserl's Philosophy.* Evanston, Northwestern University Press. Translated by Kathleen McLaughlin, with an introduction by J. M. Edie.

BURGER, T. 1976 — *Max Weber's Theory of Concept Formation: History, Laws, and Ideal Types.* Durham, Duke University Press.

CAPALDI, N 1975 — *David Hume, The Newtonian Philosopher.* Boston, Twayne Publishers.

CARR, D. 1974 — *Phenomenology and the Problem of History: a Study of Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology.* Evanston, Northwestern University Press.

DESCARTES, R. 1960 — *Meditations on First Philosophy.* Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill. Translated with an introduction by L. J. LaFleur.

EMBREE, L.E. (ed.) 1972 — *Life-world and Consciousness, Essays for Aron Gurwitsch.* Evanston, Northwestern University Press.

FARBER, M. 1943 — *The Foundation of Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a Rigorous Science of Philosophy.* New York, University of New York Press.

HUME, D. 1896 — *A Treatise of Human Nature.* Oxford, Clarendon Press. Edited with an analytical index by L. A. Selby-Bigge.

HUME, D. 1902 — *Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning The Principles of Morals.* Oxford, Clarendon Press. Edited with an introduction by L. A. Selby-Bigge.

HUSSERL, E. 1964 — *The Idea of Phenomenology.* The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff. Translated by William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian. Introduction by George Nakhnikian.

HUSSERL, E. 1964b — *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness.* Bloomington, Indiana University Press. Translated by James S. Churchill and edited by Martin Heidegger with an Introduction by Calvin O. Schrag.

HUSSERL, E. 1965 — *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy: Philosophy as Rigorous Science, and Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man.* New York, Harper & Row. Translated with notes and an introduction by Q. Lauer.

HUSSERL, E. 1969a — *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology.* London, Allan & Unwin. Translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson.

HUSSERL, E. 1969b — *Formal and Transcendental Logic.* The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff. Translated by Dorian Cairns.

HUSSERL, E. 1970a — *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: an Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy.* Evanston, Northwestern University Press. Translated with an introduction by D. Carr.

HUSSERL, E. 1970b — *Logical Investigations*, Vols. 1 and 2. London, Routeledge & Kegan Paul. Translated by J. N. Findlay.

HUSSERL, E. 1973a — *Cartesian Meditations; An Introduction to Phenomenology.* The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff. Translated by Dorian Cairns.

HUSSERL, E. 1973b — *Experience and Judgment; Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic.* Evanston, Northwestern University Press. Translated by J. S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks.

INGARDEN, R. 1975 — *On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism.* The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff. Translated from the Polish by Arnor Hannibalsson.

JUNG, R. 1965 — "Systems of Orientation" in Manfred Kochen (ed.) *Some Problems in Information Science.* New York, The Scarecrow Press, pp.67-93.

KANT, I. 1929 — *Critique of Pure Reason.* London, Macmillan. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith.

KANT, I. 1950 — *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics.* New York, Bobbs-Merrill with an intrpduction by L. W. Beck.

KOCKELMANS, J. 1967 — *Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and its Interpretation.* New York, Doubleday.

MALL, R. A. 1973 — *Experience and Reason: the Phenomenology of Husserl and its Relation to Hume's Philosophy.* The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff.

MERLEAU-PONTY, M. 1964 — *The Primacy of Perception: And Other Essays.* Evanston, Northwestern University Press. Edited with an Introduction by J. M. Edie.

NATANSON, M. 1973 — *Edmund Husserl, Philosopher of Infinite Tasks.* Evanston, Northwestern University Press.

RICOEUR, P. 1967 — *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology.* Evanston, Northwestern University Press. Translated by E. G. Ballard and L. E. Embree.

SCHUTZ, A. 1967 *The Phenomenology of the Social World.* Evanston, Northwestern University Press. Translated by G. Walsh and F. Lehnert with an introduction by G. Walsh.

SOKOLOWSKI, R. 1970 *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution.* The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff.

SOKOLOWSKI, R. 1974 *Husserlian Meditations; How Words Present Things.* Evanston, Northwestern University Press.

WEBER, M. 1949 *The Methodology of the Social Sciences.* Chicago, The Free Press. Translated and Edited by E. A. Shils and H. A. Finch with a Foreward by E. A. Shils.

WEBER, M. 1964 *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization.* London, Collier-Macmillan. Translated by A. M. Henderson and T. Parsons.

WEBER, M. 1968 *Economy and Society*; 3 Volumes. New York, Bedminster Press. Roth, G. and Wittich, C. (eds.).

WEBER, M. 1975 *Roscher and Knies: The Logical Problems of Historical Economics.* New York, The Free Press. Translated with an introduction by Guy Oakes.

APPENDIX: THE MOTIVATION FOR WRITING THIS THESIS

The reader may be wondering why I think there is something wrong with interpretive sociology in particular or perhaps empirical social science in general that requires the establishment of some kind of theoretical foundation. Since the beginning of my sociological studies seven years ago, I have been puzzled by the striking absence of a clear and complete definition of the domain of sociology, a definition complete enough to limit and guide empirical social scientific research. Of course, a range of brief and sometimes obscure definitions of the essence of social life are available. However, while many social scientists feel that these definitions are adequate, I often found it very difficult to see if and how these definitions actually guide the empirical research being carried out.

Furthermore, not only do these domain definitions appear unsatisfactory, it has never been clear to me what kinds of subjective knowledge oriented processes correspond with or relate to any given objective domain. It seems to me that a complete foundational definition of an objective domain of research must consider how and in what ways a human being's knowing processes interact with it. In this context, Weber's concept of "interpretive understanding" seems to at least direct one's attention towards the problem of the kinds of subjective knowing processes that relate to the objective domain of social action. It seems to invite the question of exactly what subjective knowing processes lie concealed in this concept, and exactly how these processes relate to the objective domain of social action.

At this point in its evolution, empirical social science could to a significant extent be characterized as a-theoretical, a kind of "people oriented accounting". I call it accounting because much of the empirical research carried out appears to be no more theoretical than the accounting technology available to determine the profitability of a business enterprise. While the largely a-theoretical status of accounting does not appear to be a major problem because the results are practically useful, I doubt whether much of the a-theoretical empirical social science being practiced could make a similar claim. While empirical social science need not be practically useful, it must, in my opinion, be theoretically useful if its practical usefulness is not apparent.

If empirical social science is to be theoretically useful, it must have a clear idea of the limits or conditions that define the domain of research. Without such limits any topic of research, amongst the infinite number of topics possible, is equally legitimate and equally questionable. One need merely randomly examine the infinite range of actual research being carried out, to test this claim. Empirical social science is, in other words, greatly in need of a theoretical foundation that limits and guides empirical research. As Husserl would probably say if he were alive today: this is the fundamental "crisis" of empirical social science today.

If empirical social science is to be theoretically useful, it must also direct its attention towards identifying those subjective knowing processes that relate to or correspond with the objective domain identified. If these subjective processes are not identified

empirical social science will continue to be forced to accept the unrealistic assumption that a researcher's relation to whatever he is researching is something that can largely be left out of consideration so long as he "maintains his objectivity". Is it not far superior to understand how a researcher's subjective processes relate to his objective domain of research than to assume that its impact can be controlled through some kind of "act of the will" or to assume that it has no impact on that domain?

It slowly became evident to me that a more rigorous and fundamental kind of research was necessary in order properly to establish a foundation for any sub-field or field of empirical science or for empirical science generally. Such research could only be philosophical in nature if it was to avoid the pitfall of accepting unexamined presuppositions.

It soon became apparent to me that Husserl's transcendental phenomenology was "light-years" ahead of my own researches in this area. His phenomenology appeared to be based on a tradition interested in foundational problems; and Husserl's treatment of these problems seemed to be the most rigorous.

My intention then became to order Husserl's attempts in this area, to show briefly the direction this kind of research could take and thereby to encourage a broader interest in such questions.

Since Max Weber's work had been tied in with phenomenology by Schutz and others, and since some of Weber's terms could be re-interpreted so that they were at least superficially compatible with Husserl's approach to foundational problems, I decided to illustrate

my argument using some of Weber's terms.

However, any other objective domain of science would have been equally appropriate. Consequently, the framework and approach outlined in this thesis is appropriate not only for the establishment of a foundation for empirical interpretive sociology but for any other sub-domain or domain of social science or any other empirical science.